Federalism, multi-level governance & intergovernmental relations - Fédéralisme, gouvernance à plusieurs niveaux & relations intergouvernementales



underscoring the necessity for urban-municipal independence.[5] But the outputs of globalization in Canada highlight an irrefutable reality: municipal governments increasingly suffer the consequences of a flawed political system in which they have remained restricted. Together, these realities supplement the assertion that the current approach to municipal authority is in dire need of reform.

Despite this subordinate relationship, many municipal governments across Canada have been exposed to, and influenced by, many of the same kinds of forces that have contributed to the devolution of powers to the provinces from the federal government chiefly among them the migration of both people and economic activity away from rural areas to cities. Yet to this day, the subordinate role of municipalities remains a central barrier to their capacity to effectively respond to these new concerns and reach their full potential.[6] Much literature has been published centered around the municipal subordination in the Canadian federal system in which a clear consensus emerges: the growing importance of local government and large cities in particular demands that they be recognized and further acquire the appropriate authority to meet amplified challenges, and further bolster Canad ƒ ï • ‰ Ž ‘ „ ƒ Ž [7]'In an era that has been deemed as belonging to the metropolis, the big cities of Canada need more political and economic clout.[8]

Š ‹ • ' ƒ ' ‡ " ™ ‹ Ž Ž „ " ' ƒ † Ž › ‡ š ƒ • ‹ • ‡ • ‡ ˜ ‡ " ƒ Ž ‹ • • — ‡ • – ' ƒ † ˜ ƒ • … ‡ – Š … ‹ – › ó ‰ents with the appropriate autonomy needed to respond to the pressure of contemporary urban needs. It will firstly examine the nature of the relationship between the provincial and municipal governments, providing a backdrop that is characterized by a deep-rooted dependency. The second section seeks to bolster the case for reform through a discussion of the pressing demands that challenge municipal governments in the 21st century, and specifically highlight the disproportionate69(n)-1(opor)-7(ti5(hD3(e)28(BTway)4or)7169(the)-171()4(iee)-171(e)-5

A Culture of Control and Dependency: The Relationship between Canadian Municipal and Provincial Levels of Government

Historically, the Canadian political system has been fraught with conflict between the federal and provincial governments as self-interest and regionalism inevitably prevailed.[9] In the face of these realities, the political imperative of keeping the country intact necessitated a more or less decentralized form of federalism with substantially empowered provincial governments, a process which culminated in the Constitution Act of 1982.[10] Municipalities, on the other hand, have been consistently excluded from constitutional recognition, and subject to an inferior classification reinforced by 19th century legislation such as the Baldwin Act (1849) that grants provincial governments full authority over municipal matters.[11] • † „ ‡ … ƒ — • ‡ ƒ • ƒ † ƒ ï • • — • ‹ … ‹ ’ ƒ Ž ò † ‡ ˜ ‡ Ž ‘ ’ ‡ † ˆ ‘ ” ƒ ’ ‘ Ž ‹ – ‹ … ƒ Ž ‡ … ‘ • ‘ • › … Š ƒ ” ƒ … – ‡ ” ‹ œ ‡ † „ › • – ƒ ’ Ž ‡ • ’ ‘ ’ — Ž ƒ – ‹ ‘ • – Š ƒ – ™ ƒ • ’ ” ‹ • [12] ƒlöcaŽ ›gover—mmeqtsžá traditionally have had little responsibility, and relied quite heavily on provincial financial support and guidance. In some respects, this extensive provincial fiscal oversight could be seen as beneficial; local governments were granted the rights to limited, yet stable, self-source revenues (mainly the property tax) and held to tight budgets, preventing the likelihood of monetary predicaments at the local level.[13] Yet in the 21st century, this dependency continues to underpin the provincial-municipal relationship

supported their infrastructure needs.[16] Further aggravating the situation, provincial grants were, and today remain, unreliable sources of long- – ‡ ” • ˆ ‹ • … ƒ Ž • — ’ ’ ‘ ” – á ƒ • – Š ‡ ò ’ ” ‘ ˜ ‹ • … ‹ interests in the municipal level [tend] to vary over time, ranging from benign neglect to active ‹ • – ‡ ” ˆ ‡ ” ‡ ‹ [17] Reinforcing municipal subservience, these provincial grants are provided with ” ‹ ‰ ‹ † … ‘ • † ‹ – ‹ ‘ • • – Š ƒ – Ž ‹ • ‹ – – Š ‡ • — • ‹ … ‹ ’ ƒ Ž ‰ ‘ ˜ ‡ ” • • ‡ • – • ï ƒ „ ‹ Ž ‹ – determined objectives.[18] Instead, the provinces produce grants that are contingent on municipal spending in ways that meet or support provincial policy goals.[19]

Urbanization and Economic Reform in the 21st Century: The Growing Importance of the Largest Urban Areas

Since the post-Second World War era until the contemporary moment, the Canadian nation and the world alike is being fundamentally transformed through the process of globalization. In the beginning of industrial expansion, the roles of municipal governments were primarily concerned with community housekeeping, while larger policy issues remained debated in provincial and federal parliament chambers.[20] Still, all municipalities, large and small, have witnessed repercussions of these global changes. More so than ever before, local governments are being burdened with heightened responsibility, but lack the independent means to effectively address new these challenges. The contemporary system is becoming increasingly characterized by such developments: particularly, technological and economic changes, and swiftly growing populations are contributing to turmoil in Canadian governance structures.[21] Adding to the pressure for reform has been the accelerating rates of immigration to metropolitan areas, resulting in an increasing number of service delivery burdens seeping into the municipal sphere, such as: å ˆ ‹ „ ‡ ” ‘ ’ – ‹ … • ‡ – ™ ‘ ” • ‹ • ‰ affordable housing; transportation; Olympic and other sports infrastructure; environmental cleanups; increased health care costs arising from aging and pollution; tort and other liability for building inspection and airport crashes; increasing public

[16] Canada, Municipalities Newfoundland and Labrador, Continuities And Discontinuities: A Brief History Of Local And Regional Government In Newfoundland And Labrador (St. John's, 2010), http://www.municipalnl.ca/userfiles/files/CCRC%20Continuities%20&%20Discontinuities.pdf; Imbrogno, Understanding Canadian Federalism, 232

sector wage costs; alternative fuel and advance transit technology; treatment for drug and related, mental, environmental and other illness; new regulations such as airport rescue.[22]

There are among countless other demands that could not have been imagined at the time when the founding fathers first conceived the political structure of the new country, yet these

top six Canadian cities undoubtedly have the potential to become influential players on the global
• – ƒ ‰ ‡ á ò – Š ‡ • ‡ ‘ ’ ’ ‘ ” – — • ‹ – ‹ ‡ • … ƒ • „ ‡ ‡ ƒ • ‹ Ž › • “ — ƒ • † ‡ ” ‡ † in ‹ ˆ ƒ •
† ‡ ˜ ‡ Ž ‘ ’ ‹ • ‰ ‹ • ˆ ” ƒ • – ” — … – — ” ‡ ƒ • † ƒ … — Ž – — ” ‡ – Š[38] ƒ – ™ ‘ — Ž † ƒ – – ” ƒ …

It is important to consider, especially within Canada, that each region has a disproportionate mix of resources, human capacity, and opportunity. The provincial legislatures are not always the most adept at adequately assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each individual municipality: cities know their problems best, and should therefore be empowered to implement suitable solutions to their distinct needs.[39] As municipal governments continue to be severely limited in their autonomy as creatures of the province, municipalities will continue to lack the adequate tools, independence, and sustainable and predictable revenue streams needed in order to design and implement strategies, proportionate to their capacity, to achieve long-term prosperity. In the 21st century, the outputs of urbanization validate that the status quo is no longer
ƒ ™ ‘ ” • ƒ „ Ž ‡ ‘ ’ – ‹ ‘ • ã ò – Š ‡ ‹ • ’ Ž ‹ … ƒ – ‹ ‘ • • ‘ ˆ – Š ‡ • ‡ † ‡ ˜ ‡ Ž ‘ ’ • ‡ • – • ƒ ” ‡ •
‰ ‹ ˜ ‡ • – Š ‡ ƒ – – ‡ • – ‹ ‘ • [40] – Š ‡ › † ‡ • ‡ ” ˜ ‡ ä ó

‘ — – • ‹ † ‡ ˆ — • † ‹ • ‰ ƒ • † ƒ • • ‹ • – ƒ • … ‡ – ‘ „ ‡ [43] Certainly, out-migration from small towns and rural areas has accelerated over the last twenty years, leaving local governments struggling to provide adequate services in the context of a declining tax base.[44] In light of these realities, constitutionally empowering all 4000 municipalities may be of limited utility, since many municipalities may be simply too small, too economically precarious, and too unsophisticated to handle a substantial increase in political and financial autonomy.

• ƒ ò ŠŽƒ‡ ¢• ó ’ ” ‘ ˜ ‹ • … ‡ • — … Š ƒ • ‡ ™ ˆ ‘ — • † Ž ƒ • † ƒ • † ƒ „ ” ƒ † ‘ ” geographically isolated but also socially and politically, local government development has been gradual at best.[45] During periods of mass migration in the 20th and 21

most powerful cities, creating a framework within which they can coordinate, compromise, and distinguish common goals that need to be addressed by all levels of government. Such an entity ™ ‘ — Ž † Š ƒ ˜ ‡ – Š ‡ ’ ‘ – ‡ • – ‹ ƒ Ž – ‘ ò – ” ƒ • • ˆ ‘ ” • – Š ‡ ’ ‘ ™ ‡ ” † › • ƒ • ‹ … • ƒ • between the three orders of govern • ‡ • – ä Results may not be immediate, but if the Big Cities remain committed and organized, the other levels of government would find it difficult to ignore this central, unified voice.[60] The new roundtable would steadily gain political weight and influence ƒ • – Š ‡ ƒ • … ‡ • † ‡ • … › ‘ ˆ – Š ‡ — ” „ ƒ • … ‹ – › ’ ” ‘ Ž ‹ ˆ ‡ ” ƒ – ‡ • ä ò ‹ ‰ ‹ – ‹ ‡ • gradually include other cities as they continue to restructure and develop in the context of urbanization.[61] One would also anticipate that the success of this entity would encourage the provinces to recognize the desirability of greater autonomy for municipalities generally, thus inspiring a wider range of municipalities to also assert their appeal for more authority.

A Call for a Return to Collaborativ e Federalism

Urbanization will continue to reshape the Canadian political and social environment, and

Conclusion

Š ‡ … ‹ • • ‡ › Ž ‘ „ ƒ Ž • • – ‹ – — – ‡ ’ ‘ • ‹ – • – Š ƒ – ò ‹ • ƒ ™ ‘ ” Ž † – Š ƒ ungovernable, cities not states are the islands of governance on which the future order should be built. 69 The time has come for this reality to be recognized in Canada a country which, the international Forum of Federations notes, stands almost alone in failing to grant important measures of autonomy to the large cities.[70] ò ‹ ‰ ‹ – ‹ ‡ • ‘ Ž Ž ‡ … provide and encouraging ’ model for improved local government leadership and enhanced intergovernmental relations between all levels of government. It would do so by ushering in an era that would give big cities the political weight they need to address the challenges of the 21st century, which include all kinds of national issues such as poverty, pollution, poor service delivery, and conflict.[71] Complimented by the growing municipal voice in the national agenda, expedited by the new Liberal initiatives, a ò ‹ ‰ – ‹ ‡ • ‘ Ž Ž ‡ … – ‹ ˜ ‡ ó • ƒ › Œ — • – „ ‡ – Š ‡ … ƒ – ƒ Ž › • – – ‘ – Š ‡ ” ‡ – — ” † ‹ • ’ ƒ ” ‹ – ‹ ‡ • ” ‡ Ž ƒ – ‹ • ‰ – ‘ • … ƒ Ž ‡ ” ‡ • ƒ ‹ • ƒ … ‡ • – ” ƒ Ž ‹ • • — ‡ ‹ • ƒ • ƒ † ƒ á promising approach to pushing aside the roadblocks that currently stand in the path of municipal governance reform in Canada

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‡ † ‡ ” ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ^ ƒ • ƒ † ‹ ƒ • — • ‹ … ‹ ’ ƒ City Of Toronto. 2016. ˜ ‹ ‡ ™ 6 ä
http://www1.toronto.ca/wps/portal/contentonly?vgnextoid=e3e8fe581b7ff310V/nVCM10000071d60f89RCRD&vgnextchannel=56f632d0b6d1e310VgnVCM10/000071d60f89RCRD.
Herry-Saint-Onge, Veronique. "More Money, Fewer Problems?". Action Canada Fellows' Op-Ed Articles (2014).
Hume, Gord. "Municipalities Win Respect In Federal Election Campaign". Municipal World

attempt to show how state-centric conflict resolution within the EU is ineffective and in some cases, detrimental to European integration, making the argument that it has in fact exacerbated the current refugee crisis. It will be shown that the only sufficient response able to resolve the crisis is by fostering a multi-level governance method of cooperation that seeks to establish a common response to refugees[5] across all member states. In doing so, it is argued that states must be willing to forgo some of their sovereignty in order to shift a majority of authority onto the EU so as to produce a federalist structure that increases competences and the capability to organize this multi-level response. The scope of this paper is limited to asylum policy and as such, does not argue for a complete federalist overhaul of the EU, as this would certainly be rejected by member states in many policy areas. Rather, it is shown how the transition to a federalist approach in dealing with the refugee crisis may be the only effective resolution.

State-Centric vs. Multi -Level Governance Theories

Among the dominant theories of European integration, two of the prevailing concepts are state-centric and multi-

centric theory does. State-centrists seem incapable of recognizing the realities of recent EU enlargement and the ensuing treaties that significantly transferred levels of power and real decision-making authority onto EU institutions. Therefore, the state-centrist model appears to be outdated and incapable of applying itself to modern discussions of EU governance. Similarly it may not be able to induce productive analysis regarding policy negotiations. Ultimately, in the context of the refugee crisis, state-centrist theory will be able to define the singular, isolationist approaches of member states but will be ineffective of proposing a viable solution to this issue. Multi-level governance on the other hand, will be able to identify the responses of various actors, notably the EU and various member states, and can strongly argue that a higher degree of multi-level cooperation is necessary if the refugee crisis is to be resolved.

EU Asylum Policies and Practices beyond the Cold War

The Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees that was codified in 1951 served as the foundation for European asylum policy until it was restructured in 1967 to include refugees from non-European states.[10] Within this convention, refugees were protected under a shroud of liberalist universalism. Asylum was thus attainable regardless of race, gender, or religion, and was a universally practiced policy by western European states following the Second World War.[11] Throughout the Cold War, perceptions surrounding the Soviet Union, and of communism more generally, began to broaden the definition of refugee. This definition included those who suffered violations of their civil and political freedoms which, when combined with the sentiments of WWII, created a broad acceptance and common implementation of asylum policy across Europe.[12] Rather than outlining how to deal with large influxes of refugees, this policy was tailored specifically for ‹ • † ‹ ˜ ‹ † — ƒ Ž • ƒ • † ‹ • … Ž — † ‡ † -ƒ ‡•ˆ – ” ‹ Ž ‡ • ‡ ”‹ %á Š – ” – Š ‡ ‡ ‚ ‡ ž ‹ ˆ ˆ ‰ refugee back to a country where their right to life and liberty would be threatened.[13] Clearly then, early examples of European refugee policies were focused on the refugees themselves and were unanimously implemented in a concerted effort between states to mitigate con-9[.95 T-59(9i(S)-3(ta)-5)1

from within the former Yugoslavia. These episodes of strife blended with the removal of restrictions on refugees originating from the former Soviet bloc to produce a significant expansion of the number of people seeking asylum within Europe.[16] The hands of national decision-makers became tied, making it near impossible for European countries to avoid conflict and societal unrest due to the particularly complex asylum crisis that began to emerge. This led to asylum-seeking becoming a central theme in European policy resulting in the creation of several treaties, most importantly the Nice Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty. Both of these treaties sought to establish a common legislative framework for handling immigrants while also officially granting power to EU institutions so that they could influence decision-making outcomes.[17] Additionally, the Maastricht Treaty established a legal basis for adopting a common asylum and immigration process, and the Amsterdam Treaty set out minimum standards for granting refugee status.[18] The treaties also provided a framework for member states to ratify these rules and for the EU to regulate them.[19] As the project of integration intensified and the power of the EU grew, it is clear that there was a transition in the way that the EpEpEe BT15oslasta

hoping to find safety within the EU.[30] Collectively then, the reaction of many states has been to
… ” ‡ ƒ – ‡ ƒ î ˆ ‘ ” – ” ‡ • • ï ™ Š ‡ ” ‡ „ › – Š ‡ › ” ‡ ‹ • ˆ ‘ ” … ‡ – Š ‡ ‹ ” „ ‘ ” † ‡ ” • – ‘ „ ƒ ” ‘
‡ • – ‡ ” ‹ • ‰ ‹ • – ‘ – Š ‡ ‹ ” – ‡ ” ” ‹ – ‘ ” › ‹ • ‘ ” † ‡ ” – ‘ ’ ” ‘ – ‡ … – – Š ‡ • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ï • ‹ • –

The imagery that arises from this parallels that of a king in his castle digging a moat and stationing knights around his kingdom to protect himself from peasant uprisings. These European
î ˆ ‘ ” – ” ‡ • • ‡ • ï Š ƒ ˜ ‡ † ‘ • ‡ • ‘ – Š ‹ • ‰ – ‘ ” ‡ • ‘ Ž ˜ ‡ – Š ‡ … — ” ” ‡ • – … ” ‹ • y ‹ • ä

the economies of all European states. The financial reality in welcoming refugees, which requires an initial investment of public funds[43], may ward off countries who still suffer under †‡„– ’ƒ›•‡•–• ƒ•† ™‡ƒ• ‡…‘•‘•‹‡• ˆ”‘• …‘•ˆ‘”•‹••‰ –‘ –Š‡ ï• … Most recently, the attacks in Paris and a growing concern over terrorism has increased the reluctance of states to accept refugees based on religious identification. This event has significantly heightened isolationism as it has forced countries close to the attack such as Belgium, Italy, and France to close and securitize its borders in order to coordinate efforts to apprehend the perpetrators. It has also given partial justification to those countries already skeptical of accepting refugees such as Poland, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. These events have allowed them to incite demands for further restrictions, utilizing loose, xenophobic linkages of the Muslim identity of many refugees to terrorism as their source of justification.[44]

the political and social disintegration generated by this crisis. In order t ‘ ˆ ‹ š – Š ‡ ï • „ ” ‘ • ‡ • ƒ • › • – ‡ • á – Š ‡ ” ‡ ƒ ” ‡ – Š ” ‡ ‡ • ‡ › … Š ƒ • ‰ ‡ • – Š ƒ – -making power and ‡ • – Š ultimately its role in solving the refugee crisis: strict implementation and enforcement of EU asylum laws by the European Commission; amending the Dublin Regulation; and establishing an EU-wide asylum status and a centralized EU agency.

Implementing and enforcing EU asylum laws. Looking back on EU asylum policies immediately following WWII, it is evident that the EU can be collectively efficient in employing universal regulations to dealing with emigration. The current EU asylum policy, although showing promise to integrate EU institutions into higher roles of importance, has largely been seen as a failure of the EU to instigate a more liberal approach. It has been criticized as having idealized expectations about • ‡ • „ ‡ ” • – ƒ – ‡ • ï ™ ‹ Ž Ž ‹ • ‰ • ‡ • • – ‘ ƒ … … ‡ ’ – Ž ‹ „ ‡ ” ƒ Ž ˜ ƒ Ž — ‡ • ƒ • † ƒ • „ to maneuver between divergent interests to align them with EU-wide policy.[55] The

Bibliography

ƒ • ‡ ” á ƒ — Ž ƒ • † ‘ • – ƒ • ƒ „ ” ‹ ‡ Ž ƒ – ‘ • ä ò Ž Journal of English ƒ • ‹ • ‰ á Ž ‘ ‘ † ‹ •
Linguistics 36.1 (2008): 5-38. doi: 10.1177/0075424207311247.

— • ƒ • ‹ ‰ Š – • ƒ – … Š ä ò — ” ‘ ’ ‡ ƒ • • ‹ ‘ • ã ‡ ˆ — ‰ World Report 2016 • ƒ Ž Ž Š January 27, 2016. Accessed February 7, 2016. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/27/european-union-refugee-response-falls-short.

ƒ ‡ Ž ‹ • á — • ƒ • ä ò — ” ‘ ’ ‡ ï • Foreign Affairs September 2, 2015. Accessed November 30, 2015. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/western-europe/2015-09-02/europes=broken-borders.

Kern, Kristin ‡ á ƒ • † ƒ ” ” ‹ ‡ – — Ž • ‡ Ž ‡ › ä ò ‹ – ‹ ‡ • á Level of Governance ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ƒ • † ‘ ˜ ‡ ” • ‹ • ‰ Ž ‹ • ƒ – ‡ Š ƒ • ‰ ‡ – Š ” ‘ — ‰ Š ” ƒ • • ƒ – ‹ Journal of — • ‹ … ‹ ’ ƒ Ž Common Market Studies 47, no. 2 (2009): 309-332.

‡ ‰ ” ƒ ‹ • á Š ‹ Ž ‹ ’ ‘ ‡ ä ò Š ‡ ‹ • ‹ • ä Social Europe October 20, 2015. Web. Accessed December 1, 2015.

and its style of governance, this essay will go on to reflect upon public governance and self-‰ ‘ ˜ ‡ ” • • ‡ • – ‹ • – Š ‡ ‹ • ‰ ƒ ï ƒ á — • ‘ • á After examining the many folds and creases associated with the elaborate fabric of self-government in Canada, it may be concluded that while Aboriginal self-government has been implemented in a number of ways in attempt to meet the needs of Aboriginal peoples, the end results have been less than satisfying for the aboriginal people of Canada.

Aboriginal -Canadian Self Government: An Overview

Before examining the specific employments of aboriginal self-government currently operating in Canada, it is important to first examine what the term self-government constitutes. In the Canadian context, the term is far too complex to evaluate in one simple definition. Aboriginal self-government in Canada exists in a multifaceted variety of forms, so as to cater to the varying needs of different communities, such as territorial rights, trapping, hunting, and fishing rights, or administrative rights (Rynard, Welcome In, But Check Your Rights at the Door" : The James Bay and Nisga'a Agreements in Canada).

Aboriginal self-government is a highly important annexation within Canadian federal … ‘ • – ‡ š – ä – ‘ ’ ‡ ” ƒ – ‡ • ƒ Ž ‘ • ‰ • ‹ † ‡ – Š ‡ level of governance, so as to grant a degree of jurisdictional power to a distinct body, or peoples, residing within Canada. It serves to legislate delegated autonomy to said people, so as to serve their distinctive, individual aboriginal needs.

Autonomy, in some instances of self-government, may be attained through the delegation of authority from state level to a local level similar to municipal power. Alternatively, some aboriginal individuals may view self-governmental power as their inherent right, as ingrained in section 35(1) of the Canadian constitution. Lastly, some scholars, aboriginal and non aboriginal alike, have argued for powers constituting coexistent sovereignty wherein aboriginal powers would be acknowledged outside the binds of the Canadian constitution (Papillon, The Rise (and Fall?) Of Aboriginal Self-Government).

Regardless of the type of self-government that is attained, it all must first be brought about by means of negotiation between a combination of federal, provincial, local, and aboriginal governments (Rynard, Welcome In, But Check Your Rights at the Door" : The James Bay and Nisga'a Agreements in Canada). Negotiation of self-government is often a tedious, lengthy process. From the development of framework principles to the actual ratification and implementation of an agreement, the entirety of the process can take anywhere from a year to a decade (Russell). The majority of these self-government negotiations arise out of issues between aboriginal community and federal or provincial governments, pertaining to larger land claim settlements. Especially in recent years, as the

resource extraction economy in Canada has expanded exponentially, and the federal and provincial governments have begun to engage more frequently in negotiations over aboriginal rights and titles (Papillon, The Rise (and Fall?) Of Aboriginal Self-Government). As a result, aboriginal communities across Canada have been driven to voice their concerns for their lands, their rights, and their sovereignty.

The Beginning of Canadian Aboriginal Self Government: 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA)

Self-governance first came into prominence in Canada with the JBNQA; this involved ƒ• ƒ‰ ”‡‡•‡•– ™‹–Š –Š‡ ƒ•‡• ƒ› ”‡‡ï• ƒ•† –Š‡ •—‹– ‘ˆ —•
Spurred by the development of a hydroelectric plant on aboriginal lands, this development prompted the Cree and Inuit people of the regions to enter into negotiations with the federal governments (Papillon, The Rise (and Fall?) Of Aboriginal Self-Government). Such negotiations were brought into the federal limelight after the then premier of Quebec, Henry Bourassa, autonomously decided to construct a power plant serving the Quebec-owned utility, m2(y)4( )5(r)4(oe] TJET EMC /P <MCID 27>BDC BT1 0 0 1 143.7 T60.63 Tm[(u)] TJET EMC /P <M

The Second Wave of Self-Government Agreements in Canada;

‘ • • ‹ † ‡ ” ‹ • ‰ – Š ‡ ‹ • ‰ ƒ ï ƒ ƒ • - G o v e r n m e ñ t A g r e e m ê ž î t s

Following the trials of self-government that played out with the JBNQA, other Aboriginal people across Canada were watching from the sidelines 5(a)-121(w)1d9(the)-12e3(a)v(h)

government agreements in Canada, the territory still struggles with limited budgets and serious socio-economic challenges. Currently, the territory relies on the federal government

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standard or metric[1]. Primary consideration has been for population numbers (although not for rate of population growth, interestingly), and for a vague sense of diverseness. Any definition must also account for the eventuality that more cities wi Ž Ž „ ‡ … ‘ • ‡ ò „ ‹ ‰ … ‹ – ‹ ‡ the future. For the purposes of this article, I will consider Census Metropolitan Areas (CMAs) ™ ‹ – Š ƒ ’ ‘ ’ — Ž ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ‘ ^ – ™ ‘ • ‹ Ž Ž ‹ ‘ • … ‹ – ‹ œ ‡ • • ‘ ” ‰ ” ‡ ƒ – ‡ ” – ‘ „ ‡ ò „ ‹ Vancouver meet this criteria, according to the 2011 census[2]. Based on population predictions for Canadian CMAs in 2015, Calgary, Edmonton, and Ottawa- ƒ – ‹ • ‡ ƒ — ™ ‹ Ž Ž „ ‡ … ‘ • ‡ ò … ‹ – ‹ ‡ • ó ‹ • – Š ‡ ” ‡ Ž ƒ – ‹ ˜ ‡ Ž › • ‡ ƒ ” ^ — – — ” ‡ ò ‘ ’ — Ž ƒ – ‹ • ‘ ^ ‡ • • — • Canada 2016).

The first section of this paper will provide context to the debate by reviewing the most critical problems faced by big cities today, and exploring why specifically the current model for governing them is failing. The second section will elucidate the various alternative possibilities for modifying the system of municipal governance towards greater autonomy. In the final section, I advocate for the creation of city-provinces as the best way to resolve the numerous problems that exist. I also offer some possibilities as to how a change to this kind of model might work, and finally, discuss why this solution will, in all likelihood, never come to pass.

Big City, Big Struggles

Before looking at the various alternatives to the current model of city government, it is necessary to understand what the existing difficulties are. To begin with, Neil Bradford (2002) claims that Canada is more urbanized now than ever before, with nearly 80% of its population residing in cities (4; Broadbent 2008, 14; Dewing, Young, and Tolley 2006, 4). For big cities, population is a problematic strength: a large population generates significant wealth, but requires much more in terms of service provision and administration. Cities are much more diverse than the provinces in which they reside,

2001, 101-02). While managing these issues is fundamental in big cities, these are needs that simply do not exist in rural areas (Broadbent 2008, 104; Bradford 2002, 4).

Settlement services offer a good example of one area in which big cities have expertise, and yet are stymied in policy making and program design by a lack of political power, despite being able to provide the most immediate and appropriate responses on the ground (Broadbent 2008, 104-06; Bradford 2002, 12). Cities are unable to contribute their significant first-hand knowledge in policy making because they do not participate adequately in the mechanisms of national governance. For example, big cities do not have the representation by population that they ought to in the House of Commons, because of the rapid rate of urbanization and the slow rate of seat redistribution: on average, rural ridings comprise approximately 30% fewer voters than urban ridings do[3], making each individual rural vote carry more electoral weight (Broadbent 2008, 14-15). Not only is this undemocratic, but it leads to a rural or regional slant in policy making, and biases the discussion towards issues concerning those parts of Canada. For instance, large cities are ˆ ‘ … — • ‡ † ‘ • – Š ‡ ò • ‡ ™ ‡ … and knowledge-based), whereas much of the rest of – Š ‡ … ‘ — • – ” › ‹ • • – ‹ Ž Ž … ‘ • … ‡ ” • ‡ † ™ ‹ – Š – Š ‡ ò ‘ Ž … based). ‘ • ‘ • › ó ” ‘ ƒ † „ ‡ • – t r r z á v á s { Ã7ë ‹ • ‘p

ƒ • † • ‡ ” ˜ ‹ … ‡ ‘ „ Ž ‹ ‰ ƒ – ‹ ‘ • • - ƒ ‡ • – ‘ Š ‡ ‹ „ ò ” Ž ‡ ‹ • – ‘ › — ‹ ” • . „ ƒ ‡ Ž ƒ • … ‡ ó á ƒ • † … Ž ƒ ‹ • • to be redressed urgently (29). Ideally, any new mode of governance for big cities would see the unification of authority and accountability through the adoption of new, more appropriate fiscal tools (Broadbent 2008, 80-81).

Regardless of how change is made to city governance structures, there can be no question that it is urgently needed. Cities are distinct from suburban or rural areas, are highly diverse, face an enormous influx of immigrants every year, are densely populated, unaccountable, and financially unfeasible. It is to the different options for how this change might be accomplished that I will now turn.

Big Cities Done Better?

Š ‡ ” ‡ ƒ ” ‡ • ƒ • › ƒ Ž – ‡ ” • ƒ – ‹ ˜ ‡ • ƒ ˜ ƒ ‹ Ž ƒ „ Ž ‡ ^ ‘ ” ” ‡ • – ” — … – — ” ‹ • ‰ pathways to empowerment include devolution- • ƒ š ‹ • — • ò - † • ‡ ƒ ˜ š ‘ ó i n é reasing federal-

population[10], and it would be extremely difficult to get enough provinces on board (4, 233; Dodek 2013, 105; Broadbent 2008, 201; Dewing, Young, and Tolley 2006, 11). As the

the inherent flexibility of federalism, s ƒ › • –Š ƒ – ˜ ‘ Ž — • – ƒ ” › ƒ ” ” ƒ • ‰ ‡ • ‡ • – • ò ƒ ” ‡ • ‘
for a constitutional assignment of responsibilities, nor do they relieve us of the need to
… ‘ • • ‹ † ‡ ” … ‘ • • – ‹ – — – ‹ ‘ • ƒ Ž … Š ƒ • ‰ ‡ • ™ Š ‡ • … ‹ ” … — • • – ƒ • … ‡ • ” ‡ “ — ‹
is prepared to accommodate minority groups, it arguably cannot accommodate majorities
such as urban-dwellers • ‘ ” • Š ‘ — Ž † ‹ – Š ƒ ˜ ‡ – ‘ ä Š ‡ ” ‡ ˆ ‘ ” ‡ á ƒ • ƒ † ƒ ï • „ ‹ ‰ ‰
served and best able to serve the nation if they are constitutionally entrenched as city-
provinces.

ƒ • ƒ † ƒ ï • Ž ƒ ” ‰ ‡ • – … ‹ – ‹ ‡ • ƒ ” ‡ • – ” — ‰ ‰ Ž ‹ • ‰ á ƒ • † – Š ‡ › Š ƒ
arguments that I have set out here clearly define a need for change to the structures by which
ƒ • ƒ † ƒ ï • „ ‹ ‰ … ‹ – ‹ ‡ • ‰ ‘ ˜ ‡ ” • ä Š ‡ › ˆ ƒ s..whi ch pr ev ent t hem fr om ˆ ˆ ‹ … — Ž –
functioning effectively: they are hugely diverse, highly populated, and profoundly distinct
from other areas in their surrounding regions; their citizens are underrepresented in
parliament; they are disadvantaged fiscally in terms

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Regionalism has been a prominent feature of Western Canadian political culture even prior to Alberta and Saskatchewan joining confederation in 1905. One manifestation of this regionalism is through intergovernmental conflict, particularly jurisdictional disputes between the provincial and federal governments. These disputes have generally seen provincial governments of various ideological leanings cooperate, and yet decentralization or expansion of provincial jurisdiction is a position that has largely been advanced by conservatives in recent decade.[1] Is there an ideological connection between expansion of provincial jurisdiction and conservatism? This essay contends that the conservative ideology particular to Western Canada was uniquely influenced by the dynamic of federal-provincial relations in Canada because [illegible]

[illegible]

points to the media and schools, shared experiences, and a

but were rather a continued attempt to attain equality with the other provinces in the federation whether the inequality was real or perceived.[29] G. Bruce Doern and Glen Toner highlight that dissatisfaction with ––ƒ ™economic policy had a very real effect on ™‡•–‡”•perceptions of Central Canada whether or not the policies were truly discriminatory.[30]

The situation for the west and Alberta in particular changed dramatically with the discovery of oil at Leduc in 1947. Oil changed the dynamic of federal-provincial relations for two reasons: one, the properties of

of fortune in the way of economic opportunity. As such, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, we see a pattern by which each level of government tries to strengthen its jurisdictional claim. Prior to 1973, the federal and provincial governments generally agreed on the goals of energy policy: to stimulate the energy industry.[33] Nonetheless, both levels of government

implementation of the National Energy Program by the government of Pierre Trudeau in 1980.

Exploited Again?

The National Energy Program (NEP) was the single most important

Indeed, the strongest and most prolific federal-provincial conflicts occurred during this period,

perceived to be favouring the conservative voters of other regions and Quebec in particular.[53] This left an opportunity for a party espousing the ideas of western conservatism to emerge. Although Manning sought to establish a party of the West rather than a party of ideology, the values and policies of the party clearly align with those we have found to be western conservative here: populism, liberalism and capitalism.[54]

Importantly for our purposes, though, the Reform Party continued to advocate for decentralization. [55] Reform, unlike the Progressive Conservative government of Peter Lougheed or even the UFA and Social Credit parties before them, contested only at the federal level. Their advocacy for decentralization conferred no direct benefit in terms of the expansion of their powers. In fact, had the Reform Party proved electorally successful and had the opportunity to form government, this

provincial rights continue to be asserted alongside other conservative values. On the other hand, decentralization could be considered a means to an end for implementing these other values. Considering the longevity of their relationship, we can perhaps tentatively conclude the former. Future research might examine whether this link persists in the future: the heartland of western conservatism, Alberta, is now governed by the New Democrats, and the Conservative Party has recently lost power to the Liberal Party federally. How conservatives react to these changes will give us an indication of whether the relationship between decentralization and conservatism is as solid as it has appeared.

F

Federalism-e

Ž ï 2 – Š ‹ ‘ ’ ‹ ‡ † ƒ • • … ‡ • † ‡ — š • ‡ … – ‹ ‘ • • á ’ ‘ — ” ˆ ‹ • ƒ Ž ‡ • ‡ • – ‹ Ž Ž — • – ” ‡ ”
Ž ï ƒ nir de cette nouvelle fédération.

Fédéralisme du type ethnique

‡ ˆ ± † ± ” ƒ Ž ‹ • • ‡ ‡ – Š • ‹ “ — ‡ ± – ƒ ‹ – ’ ‡ ” - — … ‘ • • ‡ Ž ƒ • ‡ ‹ Ž Ž ‡ — ” ‡
ethniques interminables dans ce pays, or, avec du recul, il est discutable à savoir si cela était vraiment une bonne décision. En fait, ce type de fédéralisme a apporté plusieurs nouveaux
’ ” ‘ „ Ž ° • ‡ • á ‡ • † ± „ — – ƒ • – ’ ƒ ” Ž ƒ • ± ’ ƒ ” ƒ – ‹ ‘ • † ‡ • ” ± ‰ ‹ ‘ • • ä ƒ • • — • ’

pourquoi le fédéralisme ethnique a été adopté, mais il ne semble pas avoir de progrès à ce niveau.

analysons ce que les dirigeants ont décidé de faire avec la région du SNNP (Southern Nations, Nationalities and People Region). Généralement, les régions contiennent entre 1 et 5 différentes ethnies afin de tenter de conserver un bon équilibre, or, la région du SNNP contient 46 différentes
région sont énormes. Aussi bien que ceux-ci ont déjà débuté, prenons le cas de la communauté Silte
laquelle elle était identifiée, car elle se disait distincte de celle-ci. Par conséquent, après avoir fait un référendum chez les Siltesceux-ci se sont séparés et ont maintenant leurs propres communautés (Habtu 2004, 108-109). Les problèmes émergeants du fédéralisme ethnique ne sont pas seulement en matière de guerres, mais aussi en terme de séparations de populations. La flexibilité et la facilité de se faire reconnaitre comme une ethnie distincte sont trop élevées, ce processus peut être utilisée avec abus auprès des différentes ethnies.

Cette situation peu semblée peu importante, mais en ayant une communauté distincte les

ˆ ƒ ‹ ”‡ ä ‡ “ — ‡ •‘ — • ˜‘ — Ž ‘•• †‹”‡ ‡•– “ — ï ‡• †± … ‡•– ” ƒ Ž ‹ • ƒ •– Ž ‡ ’Ž
‰ ‘ — ˜ ‡ ” • ‡ • ‡ • – • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ƒ Ž ƒ — •‹˜ ‡ ƒ — †‡ Ž ƒ ’ ‘ ’ — Ž ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ‡ • – ’Ž — • ‘ —
véridique dans le cas où les institutions fédérales sont quasi-invisibles dans les différentes régions
† ‡ Ž ï 2 – Š ‹ ‘ ’ ‹ ‡ á … ‡ “ — ‹ … ƒ — • ‡ † ‡ • Ž ‹ • ‹ – ‡ • • ± ” ‹ ‡ — • ‡ • ƒ — ’ ” ‘ Œ ‡
– ‡ • – ‡ ” † ï ƒ … … ‘ • • ‘ † ‡ ” ‡ – † ï ‹ • – ± ‰ ” ‡ ” Ž ‡ ’Ž — • ’ ‘ • • ‹ „ Ž ‡ – ‘ — – ‡ • Ž
Ž ï ƒ ‘ • ‹ ‡ • ‘ ‹ – „ ‹ ‡ • á ‡ – • ² • ‡ ‡ • … ‘ — ” ƒ ‰ ‡ ” á • ‹ … ‡ Ž ƒ • ï ‡ • – ’ ƒ •
† ï — • ‹ ˆ ‹ … ƒ – ‹ ‘ • á … ‡ ’ ” ‘ Œ ‡ – ‡ • – † ± † ‹ ± • Ž ï ± … Š ‡ … † ‡ • á s w t ä

Dans les pages précédentes nous avons étudié les conséquences non anticipées par les
† ‹ ” ‹ ‰ ‡ ƒ • – • “ — ‹ ‘ installer un fédéralisme ethnique en Éthiopie. Ce qui est le plus effrayant
en regardant ces conséquences est que celles- … ‹ • ï ‡ • – ” ‡ … ” ‘ ‹ • ‡ • – … ‘ • • – ƒ • • ‡ • – ä •
‡ • ‘ „ • ‡ ” ˜ ƒ • – – ‘ — • … ‡ • … ‘ • • ± “ — ‡ • … ‡ • ‡ • • ² • ‡ – ‡ • ’ • á renforcement ƒ ‹ • ‘ •

éduquées. Par conséquent, étant plus conscient des enjeux et étant conscient de leurs potentiels, la tentation de se séparer et de former leur propre nation peut sembler plus attrayante et surtout plus réalis

• … ± • ƒ ” ‹ ‘ – ” ° • ’ Ž ƒ — • ‹ „ Ž ‡ ä ‡ ’ ‡ • † ƒ • – á Ž ƒ ’ ƒ ” – ‹ . . . . . Ž ƒ …
‹ • ’ ‘ ” – ƒ • – ‡ † ‡ Ž ƒ … ‘ • • à ‹ † ← ” ‡ – ‹ “ • • ä ï ‡ Ž Ž • ‡ – ‡ • – Ž ƒ • ‡ — Ž ‡ … Ž ƒ — • ‡ “ —
moment, même lorsque le pays est en « ± – ƒ – † ï — ÿ ‰ ‡ ‘ • • . . ± ‡ “ — ‡ • • ‡ • – á • ‹ … ‡ – – ‡ … Ž
respectée, nous pensons fortemen

Federal

Tableau 2.1

Source: Habtu 2005, 320

Annexe 3

Article 39 The Right of Nations, Nationalities and Peoples:

1. Every nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right to self determination up to secession.
2. Every nation, nationality and people shall have the right to speak, write and develop its language and to promote its culture, help it grow and flourish, and preserve its historical heritage.
3. Every nation, nationality or people in Ethiopia shall have the unrestricted right to administer itself; and this shall include the right to establish government institutions within the territory it inhabits and the right to fair representation in the federal and state governments.
4. The right to self determination up to secession of nation, nationality and peoples may be exercised:-
(a) where the demand for secession is approved by a two thirds (2/3rds) majority of the legislature of the nation, nationality or people concerned.
(b) where the Federal Government within three years upon receipt of the decision of the legislature of the nation, nationality or people demanding secession, organises a referendum for the nation, nationality or people demanding secession.
(c) where the demand for secession is supported by a simple majority vote in the referendum.
(d) where the Federal Government transfers power to the parliament of the nation, nationality or people which has opted for secession.
(e) where propert is partitioned in accordance with the law.
5. The term "nation, nationality and people" shall mean a community having the following characteristics: People having a common culture reflecting considerable uniformity or similarity of custom, a common language, belief in ateement2ity,eon

Žï‹•˜‡”•‡á Žƒ ‘••–‹–——–‹‘• ƒ——”‹…Š‹‡••‡ …‘•–‹‡•– • ’”‡•‹°”‡
‡• ^ƒ˜‡—” †‡• —•†‡•Ž¡•†‡”ä ‡ ’”‡•‹‡” ‡•– Žïƒ„•‡•…‡ †‡ ’”‹•ƒ
second découle de leur pouvoir résiduel. En effet, la priorité est accordée aux États fédérés pour des compétences simultanément attribuées aux Bundesländer et au fédéral, mais pour lesquelles la ‘••–‹–——–‹‘• •ï‹•†‹“—‡ ’ƒ• …Žƒ‹”‡•‡•– Žƒ ”±’ƒ”–‹–‹‘• †[13]‡• ”‡•’‘•ƒ

La valeur de ces prérogatives en principe favorables aux Bundesländer est toutefois négligeable ’—‹•“—ï‡ŽŽ‡• ’‡—˜‡•– –‘——– †‡ •²•‡ ²–”‡ ‘——”‡’ƒ••±‡• ’ƒ” Ž‡ „‹ƒ constitutionnelle. Premièrement, la théorie de la pétrification impose Žï‹•–‡”’”±–ƒ–‹‘• † ‘••–‹–——–‹‘• ‡• ^‘•…–‹‘• †‡ •‘• •‡•• †ï‘”‹‰‹•‡ ‡– ’‡”•‡– †‘•… ƒ— †‘•ƒ‹•‡• ƒ—š …‘•’±–‡•…‡• “—‹ Ž—‹ ‘•– ±–± ƒ––”‹„—±‡• ‹•‹–‹ƒ ‰ ”ƒ•†‡•‡•– ^ƒ …‹Ž‹ sont venus élargir des compétences fédérales[14]. Deuxièmement, Ž‡ ^±†±”ƒŽ ƒ Žƒ …ƒ’ƒ…–‹–± †‡ ”ƒ’’ƒ”–‹‡” …‡”–ƒ‹•‹•…‘•’±–‡•…‡• ‘•– —• “—‡Ž…‘•“—‡ Ž‹‡• ƒ˜ƒ… Žï—•‡ †‡• •‹‡••‡•ä ƒ” ‡š‡•’Ž‡á Ž fédéral la lutte contre les incendies de forêt, sachant que la lutte aux incendies est du ressort des États et la forêt de celui du fédéral[15].

ƒ•• —• ƒ——”‡ ‘”†”‡ †ï‹†±‡•á —• †‡• ƒ˜ƒ•–‰‡• †— ”±‰‹•‡ ^± de laisser une cert

En définitive, le système étatique allemand est „‹‡• ’Ž—• †±…‡•–”ƒŽ‹••± “—‡ …‡Ž
au-†‡Ž• †— ^ƒ‹– “—‡ …‡• †‡—š ^±†±”ƒ–‹‘•• •‘‹‡•– …ƒ”ƒ…–±”‹•±
ƒ•†‡” †±–‹‡••‡•– †ƒ˜ƒ•–ƒ‰‡ †‡ Ž‹„‡”–± †ƒ•• Ž‡—” ‡š±…—–‹‘
Bundesländer autrichiens. De plus, malgré le fait que la population allemande soit elle aussi homogène comme en Autriche, il y a une importante considération des enjeux régionaux au niveau fédéral et cela émane de la composition et du rôle unique que joue le Bundesrat au sein de la fédération.

Suisse : les cantons et la population en tant que fondements de la fédération

ƒ•†‹• “—ï‡ŽŽ‡ ±•—•°”‡ –‘——– †‡ •²•‡ Ž‡• …‘•’±–‡•…‡• ^±†±”ƒ

obligatoire, tandis que la Loi fondamentale

En réponse à leurs grandes obligations, les États doivent avoir accès à des ressources financières appréciables. À cet effet, certaines compétences financières sont attribuées de façon semblable dans les trois fédérations, par exemple pour les taxes douanières et la responsabilité de la dette qui sont dans tous les cas exclusivement de compétence fédérale[48].

Ž •ï ‡• ‡•– …‡’‡•†ƒ•– ’ƒ• –Ž‘ï←•Œ–ƒ—””•†‡ƒ•ƒ←ä–”‡• …‘•’±–‡•…‡ financiers en Autriche sont en majeure partie détenus par le gouvernement fédéral[49]. Par exemple, …‡ †‡”•‹‡” …‘••‡”˜‡ Ž‡• …‘•’±–‡•…‡• ‡š…Ž—•‹˜‡• †ï‹•’‘•‡” †ï‡•’”—•–‡” • Ž ï‡Ž”ƒ••‰–ï‡• —‹•••‡ ‡–• Ž Ž‡•ƒ‰•‡á …‡Ž Ž‡•

de manière à permettre à ce gouvernement de recueillir plus de 90% de la totalité des revenus du pays. On constate donc un déséquilibre vertical prononcé : les États fédérés et les collectivités Ž ‘ … ƒ Ž ‡ • • ‘ • – ” ‡ • ’ ‘ • • ƒ „ Ž ‡ • † ï ‡ • ˜ ‹ ” ‘ • u r ¨ † ‡ • † ± ’ ‡ • • ‡ • – ‘ – ƒ Ž ‡ • † — mesure de percevoir que 10% des revenus. Considérant que les transferts financiers intergouvernementaux sont voués à atténuer ces déséquilibres, le poids important de ces transferts dans le budget des communes autrichiennes et des Bundesländer témoigne sans surprise de la † ± … ‡ • – ” ƒ Ž ‹ • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • • ‹ • ‹ • ‡ † ‡ Ž ï — – ” ‹ … Š ‡ ä

ƒ • ‹ – — ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ‡ • – † ï — • ‡ – ‘ — – ƒ — – ” ‡ • ƒ – — ” ‡ ‡ • Ž Ž ‡ • ƒ ‰ • ‡ ‡ – leur répartition constitutionnelle des compétences financières et fiscales entre les divers échelons gouvernementaux est beaucoup plus balancée et permet aux États fédérés et aux collectivités locales † ï ƒ • ƒ • • ‡ ” † ï ‹ • ’ ‘ ” – ƒ • – ‡ • ” ‡ … ‡ – – ‡ • ä nancier de la Confédération suisse démontre son impressionnante décentralisation, car les cantons et leurs communes sont collectivement responsables de 58% des dépenses du pays tout en recueillant 48% des revenus. La situation est assez similaire en Allemagne, mais étant donné que le gouvernement central est ” ‡ • ’ ‘ • • ƒ „ Ž ‡ † ï — • ‡ ’ ” ‘ ’ ‘ ” – ‹ ‘ • ’ Ž — • ‰ ” ƒ • † ‡ † ‡ • † ± ’ ‡ • • ‡ • ‡ – † ‡ • ” ‡ Ž ï ƒ • ’ Ž ‡ — ” † ‡ • ƒ † ± … ‡ • – ” ƒ Ž ‹ • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • • ï ‡ • – ” ‘ — ˜ ‡ ” ± † — ‹ – ‡ ä

‘ — ” – ‡ ” • ‹ • ‡ ” á Ž ï ƒ • ƒ Ž › • ‡ † ‡ Ž ƒ † ±. ‡ ‹ • ˆ ± ” ƒ Ž ‘ ƒ • ƒ ← ‘ • • • † ƒ ‡ — • ‡ ‹ • • ‡ á † † ï — – ” ‹ … Š ‡ • ‘ — • ƒ ’ ‡ ” • ‹ • † Ž ï … ‘ • ” ← ƒ . Š ‡ ” ‡ “ • — ‡ Ž ï ‹ • … ƒ ” • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • • ² • ‡ fortement centralisée, • — • – ‡ Ž ’ ‘ ‹ • – “ — ï ‡ Ž Ž ‡ ‡ • – † ƒ ˜ ƒ • – ƒ ‰ ‡ … ‡ • – ” ƒ Ž ‹ • ± comme le Japon[59]. ‘ — • ƒ ˜ ‘ • • ‡ • ‘ — – ” ‡ ’ — … ‘ • • – ƒ – ‡ ” “ — ‡ Ž ƒ — ‹ • • ‡ ‡ • – ” ± ‰ ‹ • ‡ ˆ ± † ± ” ƒ Ž ‰ ” ƒ • † ‡ • ‡ • – † ± … ‡ • – ” ƒ Ž ‹ • ± á ƒ Ž ‘ ” • “ — ‡ Ž ‡ † ‡ ‰ ” ± relativement plus modeste.

Aux termes de ce qui précède, Ž ï ‡ š ‹ • – ‡ • … ‡ † ‡ † ‹ ˆ ˆ ± ” ‡ • … ‡ • ’ ƒ ” ˆ ‘ ‹ • ˆ ‘ Ž ï ‘ ” ‰ ƒ • ‹ • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ‹ • • – ‹ – — – ‹ ‘ • • ‡ Ž Ž ‡ ‡ – … ‘ • • – ‹ – — – ‹ ‘ • • ‡ Ž Ž ‡ † ‡ • ˆ † ï Ž Ž ‡ • ƒ ‰ • ‡ • ‡ … ‘ • • – ‹ – — ‡ ’ ƒ • — • ‘ „ • – ƒ … Ž ‡ • Ž ‡ — ” † — ” ƒ „ ‹ Ž ‹ – capacité à s ï ƒ Œ — • – ‡ ” ƒ — š ” ± ƒ Ž ‹ – ± • • ƒ – ‹ ‘ • ƒ Ž ‡ • ä ‘ — – „ ‹ ‡ • … ‘ • • ‹ † ± ” ± • ² • ‡ … ƒ † ” ‡ † ï ƒ • ƒ Ž › • ‡ • † ï ƒ — – ” ‡ • ˜ ƒ ” ‹ ƒ • – ‡ • † — ˆ ± † ‰ saxon, en se … ‘ • penchant notamment sur les effets du fédéralisme asymétrique au sein des fédérations du Canada et de la Malaisie

[59] OCDE, «Panorama des administrations publiques 2013», Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques [En ligne], 2014, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/4213202e.pdf?expires=1458183025&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=2C4C9E2921B92282BD7E6BC2326C784C. (Consulté le 14 mars 2016)

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‡ — – • Š ‡ ” — • † ‡ • – ƒ ‰ á ü ‘ ‹ ˆ ‘ • † ƒ • ‡ • – ƒ Ž ‡ ’ ‘ — ” Ž ƒ ‡[En ligne], 2012, http://www.bundestag.de/blob/189762/f0568757877611b2e434039d29a1a822/loi_fondamentale-data.pdf. (Consulté le 7 mars 2015)

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—–Š‘”• ¬ †‹–‘”•

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