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Foreword

This is the second in a series of monographs, published under the general title, Queen's Studies on the Future of the Canadian Com-

which at the same time advance our intellectual understanding of the problems of the Canadian federal system and directly focus on the broad political choices which face us.

Preface

This monograph is concerned with three questions: What kinds of com-

... .. Can do? How and where are these communities to be

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1 Learning from Comparative Experience

What can we as Canadians learn from the experience of other countries? Currently governmental decision-makers, numerous citizen groups, and others, are examining various options for altering the way we govern ourselves. There have been calls for more decentralization — for greater

This monograph, therefore, has two aims: (1) to help provide an understanding of the pressures faced by the Canadian federal system.

Social phenomena do not have a property of "being comparable" or "not comparable". "Comparability" depends upon the level of generality of the language that is applied to express observations. The response to the classical objection to compar-

two countries, their so-called uniqueness notwithstanding. The latter point is especially important; frequently people will raise objections to cross-national comparisons by invoking the "unique" qualities of systems, qualities which in reality may have very little bearing on the problem at hand. Medical scientists, when they discover that the rate of a

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...we usually think in terms of contemporary political con

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could be called developed and another category of so-called undeveloped

of the Northern Hausa ethnic group. This group was essentially bounded by one of the four states; however, it constituted over fifty percent of the

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Do they determine the degree of decentralization of patterns of growth?

while the latter is not. A comparison of this sort can highlight the impact


of the latter on the former. National economic policy

pinpoint with greater certainty the effects of constitutional change. Many of the basic social and economic forces in French society remained constant. The influence of these forces on political life, however, was altered largely because of institutional changes: the legislature in the Fifth Republic became much less important, and many interest groups which previously had access to government through parliamentary deputies found that their influence had declined considerably (Brown, 1968). In terms of learning what might be achieved through constitu-

7. The "Federation des Francophones hors Quebec" has made proposals to this effect (1979). For example, it would like to see a new upper chamber, the House of the

2 Cleavages, Institutions and Political Communities


Federal systems usually consist of two or more territorially based com




tional change is what *kinds* of communities will be preserved and de-
veloped under each of the different treatments. (C. E. S. 1970)

rates communities, and to a large extent defines them, is the distinctiveness of the combined interests of citizens of each of the communities.

political leaders. The resources and means of control made available by a religious cleavage, for example, are quite different from those involving





uncertain material rewards by fleeing to the socialist camp? (Lorwin, 1974). It is worth noting that the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU) in Quebec was a Catholic trade union federation until the early 1960's. In the case of the West European working class, many workers


(1974) noted: "The moderation of early Christian social organizations helped to keep the demands for social reform moderate."

1978). This enabled the Church to shape the perceptions of its followers. In the absence of straightforward and easily observable criteria, Catholics were more dependent on instruction and information from church leaders. Indeed, Dutch Catholics were told for many years that

religious blocs had to cater not only to the religious needs of their clientele but also to their economic interests. If the latter were sufficiently heterogeneous, then the leaders could not afford to take extreme positions on behalf of one part of their constituency. Since conflicting economic interests were reconciled within the blocs, this produced mod-

What lessons can we draw from this for Canada? The provinces in
Canada differ from the religious blocs in the Netherlands; they are based

at stake. After all, France is where Catholicism died in 1789. Again, however, the cry was for isolation rather than the restructuring of Cana-




tions were, and to a large extent still are, based on the so-called "spiritual" cleavage. There are three basic blocs: Catholic, socialist, and liberal. The latter two are basically anti-clerical. A major issue, not



interests — does appear to offer a natural basis for building a more

collective basis but their demands are not necessarily redistributive in nature (Rose and Urwin, 1969). Unions are often quite willing to pass on increased costs to others in order to raise the wages of their members. At the same time, they are not unduly concerned whether the costs are passed on to owners of the factory, to consumers, or to government. At times the demands may indeed be redistributive in intent, but they



D. The Ethnic Cleavage

Ethnicity is one of the more ill-defined and most often used concepts in the social sciences. The term is often employed in situations where it

claims that "primordial bonds" act to hold groups of individuals together. The notion of primordial bonds is rather imprecise. However,

cases, demands for collective change are less likely to occur; members of a
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted] without "voices" and become un

acquire competence in English at the possible expense of losing their unique cultural identity. They realized that these factors discouraged many French-Canadians from entering corporations and meant that they would remain under-represented in this important sector of economic life (Morrison, 1970). Hence, the pressure for measures which would ensure that French-Canadians could maintain their "biculturalism."

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
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become expert in transforming "all or nothing issues" into ones which

munity, and moderate elements do not have the choice of leaving



the territorial factor is entirely absent. Exceptions are Malaysia and Indonesia, where members of the different communities are largely

ideological preferences of office holders, but in the new forces

with the centre as a means of upward mobility. However, if there is a surfeit of potential leaders from the peripheries, channels for mobility may become blocked, and local elites may decide to concentrate on developing their local area as a basis of influence. Recently, in the United

accrue solely to citizens of the province and diseconomies and costs

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the development of communication networks. Thus, unlike the situation with classes which are dispersed across a vast geographical expanse, information concerning discriminatory treatment of a geographical area

situations, the relationship can be seen by both parties as being symbiotic: the primary producers in the periphery may find that the deck is stacked in their favour. Natural resources like oil or natural gas may be

raw materials. According to the historian J.W. Breugel (1973), this was the major reason why German industrialists in Sudetenland supported the regime in Prague. The German Social Democratic Party in Sudetenland tacitly supported the regime as well. There is a strong parallel


The voters of northern England, unlike those of Scotland and

years, there has been considerable criticism of this so-called sociological reductionism. Picking up on the theme of institutions as the mobiliza-

bias of the RNA Act no longer had a pronounced effect. From the latter


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
It is the goal of most governments to be re-elected. In pursuing this




+ Poeyu poljau!
grenda!

tics, such as religious blocs, tended to be authoritarian and were better able to co-ordinate the perceptions of their memberships, while blocs based on status tend to be more democratic. Elites of religiously based







constituent units. We are able to make generalizations about systems

noted in 1971, "In the long run, this is too fragile a basis to work on. In times of stress, democracies can survive by applying intelligent legal rules and sticking to them." (Van der Esch, 1971).

Comparative analysis, however, can also help us in defining the substance of these rules. Furthermore, on the basis of comparative work, we might


7. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972), in their well-known work on democratic instability,

Who Benefits Most*

Quebec

32%

6%



3 Canada and the Consociational Model

In grappling with the problem of Canadian unity, one major question

integration of the Western European countries into one nation-state.


It is a list of countries that had to be present for

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
1. *Levels of conflict: a common experience among people within a divided*

strongly committed to the maintenance of the system. Finally, they must be aware of the perils of political fragmentation (Lijphart, 1974, p. 79).
Basically, Lijphart assumes that the classmate divides the world

There are certain areas, however, where these differences are less apparent. Although there is a distinctive literature which is written for and by Catholics, and another for and by Protestants, there is also a broad secular literature. In terms of the books people actually read, ~~their religious cleavages tend to disappear.~~ Even during the 1950s-



that Dutch political elites always want to bridge their differences for the well-being of the nation, or that there is an undeniable universality of the



Further reasons for the cohesion of the different blocs involved the

French-Canada, or to a number of distinct regions, such as the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario and the West – but most usefully perhaps as ‘provinces’” (p. 265). There are good reasons for interpreting Lijphart’s model in terms of provinces. In the Canadian federal system, the provinces provide a tangible institutional framework for articulating

in Belgium are reconciled *within* the spiritual blocs, and not directly in the political arena, although this has changed considerably since the early 1960's (Zolberg, 1977).

It can be argued that the Canadian provinces, except Quebec, owe their existence to institutions and political entrepreneurship (Cairns, 1977).

'If, ... the Cabinet is viewed in the broad framework of con-
sociational theory, it can be seen as a mechanism of elite ac-
commodation quite apart from the specific decisions it makes.
Its importance, in other words, can be seen to lie more in its
function of bringing together political leaders from the pro-
vinces and maintaining their continuous involvement in the
decision-making process than in the actual content of that

Noel's analogy between the Netherlands and Canada has something to recommend it. The two countries are close in a number of dimensions,

frequently receive, special treatment. The fact that this is possible probably testifies to the robustness of Canadian political institutions. Thus, if


cal parties, particularly between party leaders, and not *within* political parties. In the case of intra-party accommodation, of which the Canadian

English-Canada as the two actors, implicitly have in mind the

of the 19th Century witnessed more politics of religious confrontation, and this remained an important line of cleavage at the federal level for many years to come. Kenneth McRae (1974b) mentions a book published

1843

14




numerous proposals promoting this kind of arrangement, in addition to the demands for decentralization by the provinces, this is by far the most plausible scenario.

I would, however, argue strongly against proposals which would, consciously or unconsciously, promote a vision of this kind. Many proposals calling for decentralization, particularly provincial schemes stressing the water-tight compartments approach (i.e., disentanglement), call not so much for elite co-operation as for elite autonomy. There

leaders: public constraints on them are great, and some form of public legitimization of political agreements seems inevitable.

Lijphart (1975) noted that consociationalism in the Netherlands began

...combined with the effects of the electoral system, has success



Footnotes

1. One might add that certain practices which are considered by some to be consociational are, in fact, not, insofar as certain features, (e.g., distinctive subcultures) are lacking. This will become evident later in the paper.
2. As Wolinetz (1978) points out, elite accommodation is a feature of virtually all democratic societies. Elite accommodation in itself would not necessarily indicate that the system in question is consociational in nature. Consociational democracy involves dissensus at the mass level and accommodative behaviour on the part of the leaders of


interference in the affairs of Quebec. Thus, French-Canadians outside of Quebec

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