
Canada: The State of the Federation 1993

Edited by Ronald L. Watts and Douglas M. Brown



Institute of Intergovernmental Relations

Institut des relations intergouvernementales



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
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
231 10. Chronology of Events 1992-93

Anne Poels

PREFACE

This is th	This is the eighth volume in the annual series of the Institute of Intergove				<u>zove</u> :
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CONTRIBUTORS

	Herman Bakvis is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Dalhousie-University
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Dallaw at the Institute of I abor and Industrial Relations, University of Michigan and the Department of Political Science at Newhwestern University Cealing to Drofaccor Department of Political Science, McMaster L

University.


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
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Ronald L. Watts


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





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


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Furthermore, because of the contradictory positions of the different groups	
that supported a "No" vote in the referendum, the political leaders have been	
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generally led to the failure to moderate regional cleavages and to a cumulative

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Ce chapitre analyse le déroulement de la campagne référendaire ainsi que le soutien

Richard Johnston, André Blais, Elisabeth Gidengil and Neil Nevitte

merits serious consideration. The referendum raises a more general question about the very possibility of direct democracy. An abiding theme in the empirical study of politics is whether "public opinion" as such even exists, whether voters can make meaningful and interpretable choices on anything, much less on a document as formidably complex as the Charlottetown Accord. There is, moreover, the question of the five-day moving average "Yes" share, centred on the indicated day. The


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Table 2.1: The "Yes" Share Outside Quebec, by Region

Week	B.C.	Prairies	Ontario	Atlantic
24-27	41	60	62	
Sept.	(26)	(34)	(37)	59*
28 Sept.	44	59	63	(62)
– 4 Oct.	(55)	(105)	(88)	
5–11	31	41	44	48
Oct.	(45)	(82)	(126)	(37)
12-18	40	49	51	63
Oct.	(49)	(83)	(111)	(47)
19–25	39	32	38	61
Oct.	(47)	(98)	(146)	(60)

42 percent. In the Atlantic provinces, the "Yes" held its 60:40 margin; in the west, the margin was 40:60; and in Ontario the outcome was essentially 50:50.⁷

^{*}This num ber covers the entire period 24 Sept. - 4 Oct.




- Senate reform, allegedly the key element for westerners, received only
- ent man annuart than the evicting hody. The plurelity preference was


for outright abolition of the chamber.

• On recognizing Ouebec as a distinct society oninion was modestly

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	opposition, that sh	ould not matter; one thing is enough.	area area and a In
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
thoughts are overwhelmingly_negative. Polls about the Senate were driven by
































At the same time, the factor with the greatest positive potential, aboriginal self-government, got decoupled from the vote, at least in the vital middle of the campaign. Voters did not become less supportive of the principle of aboriginal



Second, proponents felt impelled to move beyond the arguments about the substance in the Accord to consider voting for it anyway?



dynamics. THE SOURCES OF DYNAMICS Outside Quebec, three turning points presented themselves for explanation.




accommodation with Quebec the benefit of the doubt. At least it would seem grantil Tundom himself same otherwise. dramatically:


OTHER FEATURES OF THE VOTE OUTSIDE QUEBEC

Pierre Trudeau was not the only key player. Feelings about Brian Mulroney were also caught up in the vote: the more a voter liked him the more likely he or she was to vote "Yes." Few voters liked him: our respondents typically rated him for below the Accord's other.


predictive power of leader ratings was cut. Neither the vote on the Accord nor the processing of judgements about politicians and their stances were completely detached from the ongoing party struggle in the background.

All other intervenors paled by comparison with members of the Accord coalition and with Pierre Trudeau. Some, such as the women's movement and the business community, had a modest impact in the first few weeks. Curiously, awareness of opposition by the women's movement had a greater effect for men than for women; the impact was *not* a backlash. And women were not summarily more likely to vote "No" than men. The union movement had a modest effect







In our sample, 80 percent of non-francophones voted "Yes." If anything this underestimated the "Yes" share; we suspect that the real share was closer to 85 percent.²¹ On the other, sovereignist side, 89 percent voted "No." Although




"Yes" collapse began, the most divisive issues were the 25-percent seat guar-



The Referendum on the Charlottetown Accord (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, forthcoming).




legal text. Although the official release date was Tuesday, 13 October, the effective release date was the Saturday before, the 10th: the government of Quebec made the legal text available as the Bourassa-Parizeau debate was looming and Parizeau





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When More Is Too Much: Quebec and the Charlottetown Accord

C'est par un «non» retentissant que la classe politique canadienne essuie le refus de la









ARDUOUS AND LABORIOUS NEGOTIATIONS

Following the March 1992 report of the Beaudoin-Dobbie Committee,4 the provincial governments, the major players in the constitutional revision process with respect to the amending formulas, were called upon to participate in a






interview given to the newspaper Le Monde, he declared on 19 April 1992 his

which would lead to the establishment of a third order of government. Finally, the amending formula would be modified.


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
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
The institution that would have undergone the most significant change was

for a period of five years maximum, but with the possibility of renewal. This




What is surprising about these constitutional arrangements is that the language used does not correspond to the usual sense extracted from the words. As





(a. 41), to leave — should the case arise — the judiciary to define the jurisdictions of these governments and their territory (a. 41, 42).

To satisfy the claims of Quebec, it seems to me that the concessions required would not be so significant: the nation is more a territorial society than a kinship



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Do these conditions — partially or totally joined together — announce a horizon that is politically blocked or the opening to a dynamic new alternative?

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
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of nauconemant athorshop histornal amendment to the constitution? The answer
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The State of this warms and area some of the methods governments have
The first part of this paper explores some of the methods governments hav at their disposal to bring about constitutional revision. These are ordinar
legislation, convention and reference to the courts.

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In their Preliminary Report, published in 1965, The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Riculturalism stated

1993," "Ground lost since death of accord, Mercredi says." Nor should one ignore the Rt. Hon. Joe Clark's warning:



	importance, the emotions aroused as we have attempted formal amendments
	translation for the contraction of the contraction
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	There are four basic ways that constitutional frontiers can be shifted: formal constitutional amendment, convention, statute and judicial interpretation. Let
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	will be shought accessory or averaged through those processes, so rother than
•	will be thought necessary or pursued through these processes, so rather than develop a new list of subjects for consideration I have tried to use matters that
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	Although electoral reform was not central to the recent constitutional disc sions, the topic has generated considerable interest.	us-
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Since there is an element of risk associated with references, it is likely that this

Just as there are examples of instances where cases have been referred to the


courts, there are examples of situations where provinces decided it was not in notes to talkatha mattanta agust Tura non challanges that come to mind

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INTERPROVINCIAL TRADE BARRIERS









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The government has repeatedly cut the growth in those payments used to fund old age security, higher education, and health care.³⁸

This co	mment leads on	e very quickly	y into the pol	itical minefie	eld known as_
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
	of advention 245 TH
	of education." ⁴⁵ There is a growing belief in Canada that federal involvement
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
aton should be counded. Riret after the CAP experience thought will have to be given to a means of protecting intergovernmental agreements. Second, the issue of transparency needs to be addressed. After their experiences with constitutional reform, the public will expect to be kept informed and most likely involved in influencing decisions related to reaching

THE AMENDING FORMULA: PROSPECTS FOR MORE MODEST USE

Canadians' experience with the amending formula of 1982 is relatively limited.

A part of the amending formula that needs greater scrutiny is section 43, which applies to amendments affecting some but not all provinces. In 1987 it was used to amend the provisions of Newfoundland's 1949 terms of union with respect to denominational schools. More recently, it has become






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
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



	27.	See "Governments agree on comprehensive negotiations to reduce internal trade
		\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.\.
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	28.	March 1993. Stephanie Nolen, "Ontario considers retaliating," The Globe and Mail, 7 July 1003 p. A3A and "Beer war browing between provinces" The Globe and Mail.
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Tensions in the Canadian Constitutional Process: Elite Negotiations, Referendums and Interest Group Consultations, 1980-1992

Michael B. Stein









consultative referendums or plebiscites and have applied them at the ratification stage of the Charlottetown Accord has important implications for future constitutional proposals. It suggests that the formal procedure for legislative ratifications is a suggest that the formal procedure for legislative ratifications is a suggest that the formal procedure for legislative ratifications are suggested in the suggest of the suggestion of the sugg


be superceded by a new constitutional convention involving referendums similar to the formal ratification procedure and practice in Australia. In short, in Canada today, as well as elsewhere (e.g., the European Communication of the School of Scho



surprising, therefore, according to the critics, that organized interest group opposition directed both to the content and process of Meech Lake constitution-making eventually turned a substantial majority of the Canadian public against the Accord and ultimately managed to defeat it.

[Fig. 4] Shabble and broadly consultative Canada round between 1990







Canada closely resembles that of heads of national governments in international


relations; he appropriately called this process "federal-provincial diplo-

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
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







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polar types "issue-oriented" and "institutionalized" interest groups (or more

precisely, they are portrayed as developmentally different types, ranging from "issue-oriented" to "fledgling" to "mature" to "institutionalized" groups). These are differentiated primarily by such factors as organizational features





















involving the promotion of their group interests, (iv) unlike the two other types _f recorded the manual that are a set




in such a package. The role of the two other types of groups, the "public interest" and "special interest" groups, appears to have been a marginal one in these negotiations.


However, the later actions of politicians in the patriation negotiations involving inclusion or exclusion of minority group and equality rights in the Charter



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



	have exploited such feelings of "loss aversion" to influence voters in t				
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
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



- See A. Paul Pross, Pressure Group Behaviour in Canadian Politics (Toronto: 43. McGraw-Hill, 1975); Pross, Group Politics and Public Policy (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986).
- Brodie and Nevitte, "Evaluating the Citizen's Constitution Theory," esp. pp. 235-44. 239. 45.
- Alan Cairns, Disruptions: Constitutional Struggles From the Charter to Meech Lake, ed. Douglas Williams (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1991), chap. 4. 46. Ibid., pp. 15-16.




An Experiment in Intrastate Federalism: The Cabinet Committee on Canadian Unity


INTRODUCTION









- Cabinet attracts little or no attention, and for good reason. Since the 1960s the




Smiley and Watts have argued: "No matter how much a federal system allows for the expression of regional differences through autonomous state or provincial governments, the federal solution is bound to disintegrate without some



influence. 14 With respect to the CCCU, the question becomes whether it is not the federal ministers, special interests or the general public, but non-elected




	September of 1991. Nonetheless, it is important to review briefly the avenue to
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


appointments and the constitutional amending formula, which would require unanimity, into a separate package.

The creation of the CCCU and the constitutional amending formula, which would require



council. The ambiguity of Tellier's position is noteworthy. He reported to the prime minister as clerk of the privy council and reported to Clark as secretary for FPRO Nonetheless_it provided Tellier, and through him the prime minister, end anhancing access to the deliberations of the CCCU. --- CE Think the governo of the Denuty Ministere'



Warmer Challenbare of the Cobinet Committee on Canadian Unity (CCCII) ١, Portfolio Province Member Constitutional Affairs, The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark Alberta President of Privy Council Fisheries & Oceans, Minister for Newfoundland The Hon. John Crosbie

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Agency (ACOA)

by both departmental civil servants and their own political staff. This was not the case here. There was little or no advance briefing material given to the ministers beforehand; and all material discussions.		Agr. Earnewin	
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Figure 6.2: Meetings of the Cabinet Committee on Canadian Unity Held
Outside Ottawa


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25-26 June 1991	Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario
3-4 July 1991	Quebec City, Quebec
9-10 July 1991*	Meech Lake, Quebec
1-2 August 1991	Charlottetown, P.E.I.
	Iqaluit, N.W.T.
14-16 August 1991	
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
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
would be revisited later. This was especially true with regard to central institu-


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
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










To better understand what transpired and to draw lessons it is best to return to



should be stressed that the influence of officials, and the steering committee in be unfair to say that at times ministers simply invited officials to fill a vacuum





interviews with a number of officials in the Federal Provincial Relations Office (FPRO),

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