

Quebec government, especially...

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
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
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on to form a government if he could count on substantial Liberal







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federalist rump will hold the government responsible for the eco-

the party through another election; or the government might call and win an election soon after the separation. In either case, though, there

head offices over time, and this, along with the diminution of Quebec's

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PART FOUR

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*From Referendum to  
Referendum*

*The 1995 Referendum and  
the Yes That Wasn't*

As the new Parti québécois government hatches its referendum plan-



The first section of this chapter describes the way in which the

The basic objective was to increase support for secession by appealing to the undecided "soft nationalists." As Quebecers waited for the

declared, "Quebec is a sovereign country." The remaining substan-

so many disparate actors and partisan organizations were involved. Relations were especially strained between the federal Liberals and

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In this context, divisions soon emerged in the sovereigntist ranks. While some hardliners continued to follow the December script,<sup>33</sup> others debated whether the referendum's timing and the question to

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interpreted as an insulting rebuff, or at least as denying the history of accommodation and the sense of inclusion and respect in Canada



trade, international trade, international representation, transportation, defence, financial institutions, fiscal and budgetary policies,



were being held today, would you vote for or against the sovereignty of Quebec with an offer of economic and political partnership with Canada?" Respondents answering No totalled 45.3 per cent, those answering Yes were 44.4 per cent, 6.5 per cent were undecided, and

communities comprising modern Quebec. It also contained a litany

regions about overcentralization. Bill 1 provided that the constitu-

losing any sleep. I'm extremely confident. We're way ahead of where we were two months before the referendum last time."<sup>65</sup> Indeed, the sovereigntists appeared to be making little headway, despite the publicity surrounding the launch of the campaign. While some early polls showed the voters evenly divided, with the Yes support at 49 per cent,







was divisible or not. "My own view," he said, "and that of my party, has always been consistent. The Quebec borders that we have today

an open letter to the prime minister, declaring, "We cannot stand by passively and allow Quebec voters to make the decision – separation – without offering them a vigorous defence of Canada, including a positive federalist alternative to the status quo. And we cannot let them make their decision without disputing the separatist contention that separation will be a relatively uncomplicated and painless process."<sup>87</sup> The letter covered twenty very precise questions about secession.<sup>88</sup> Such questions, Mr Manning wrote, "have been discussed

attract moderate nationalists to the sovereigntist side while reassuring them that the promised partnership was viable.

ground,<sup>94</sup> and the poll results suggest that it was followed by some movement in public opinion. On 14 October, for example, the *Globe*

There are only 3,200,000 jobs in Quebec – and past that point they'll have to import the unemployed."<sup>100</sup> As will be seen, this was a typical

carried a banner asking, "Will Canada Split?"). Like the TSE options, the volatility of Canadian dollar options peaked on 30 October at over three times normal levels. These results suggest interestingly



to prod the prime minister to issue a joint declaration: "We state unequivocally that Quebec is a distinct society. We remind you that we have both supported the inclusion of this principle in the Canadian Constitution every time Quebec has demanded it."<sup>125</sup>

Pressed hard by the Quebec wing, the No forces went much further than this in promising constitutional change.<sup>126</sup> At a huge federal

interpreted not only as "an outpouring of abiding love" but also as "a tawdry closing-time seduction."<sup>134</sup> Another possibility was the




his supporters once more: "Les Oui n'ont jamais été aussi nombreux  
que ce soir et nous sommes encore tous là. Gardons espoir, car la

## *The Logic of the Referendum Campaign*

Major campaigns are fought with many tools, but in modern democracies they are fundamentally about language and argument. Given

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But this explanation encounters two problems. First, it is not evident that support for the Yes side showed a sharp increase coincident with Mr Bouchard's assuming the leadership of the campaign. A straightforward reading of the published polls suggests that support for the No began to decline towards the end of September, well before the Bloc leader was named chief negotiator.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand



there may have been some increase in price. What else did change



challenges."<sup>22</sup> Of course, this position made the Quebec wing of the No side increasingly uncomfortable, but it was maintained until the

repetition and duplication in the federation. It was logically hard to



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committed to the position that Quebec constituted a modern and plu-

radical position. On the other hand, the position of the federal government

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of the referendum. The only way to 'Yes' is to ensure that the referendum is held.

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At times the federalists were more explicit. Mr Johnson especially stressed economic issues, arguing, for example, that "voting Yes is a risky adventure that will bring economic upheaval, affect the value of the dollar, mortgage rates, and raise interest rates on other things

and this left a gap into which the sovereigntists could spin their web of arguments about post-secession cooperation. In the absence of declarations from the No side about what they would do if they won, the

the democracy dimension. As a result, the Yes side's position on the economic dimension nearly carried the sovereigntists to victory.

The sovereigntists always insisted on the legitimacy of their *démarche*. They assumed from the outset that Quebecers had the right to deter-

mine their future, and the process of deciding whether



constitution ... If you want to talk legality and constitutionality, there's  
nobody who will argue that it is legal and ...

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democracy."<sup>77</sup> Meanwhile, Mr Parizeau, with victory in sight but Ottawa's intentions unclear, insisted not only that the transition would be calm but that all Quebecers would have to show solidarity in accepting the result of the vote, and he singled out his main provincial

... "The example comes from the top. Without misquoting I

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CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

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*Had the Yes Side Won ...*

Before moving on from the 1995 referendum to its effects and to the future, it is worth turning to an important but little-known aspect of the

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would never materialize), and Canadians would turn to their main priority, simultaneously negotiating the reconstitution of Canada as a going concern. In this whole process, some interests would be ignored and some rights infringed, but that would be inescapable; the need to resolve uncertainty would dictate the first steps of the separation, and once the process was underway it would not be halted. As one columnist put it, "Self-interested survivalism would over-

prices by province and found no significant difference; that is, the referendum result would have affected firms' market valuation wherever in Canada their head offices were located.<sup>11</sup>





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send members of Parliament to Ottawa, use the Canadian dollar, and so forth. The "fact" that voters were misinformed could be used to

about sovereignty would be protracted; and just before referendum

and more straightforward. But among Quebec voters, it seems unlikely that the nature of the question could have legitimized a refusal by Ottawa to accept the result. It is true that at the beginning of the campaign, many Quebecers found the question ambiguous,<sup>42</sup> and different people may have been voting with very different expectations about what the Yes would bring, but after a long and intense cam-



the province between the referendum of 1911 and 1912.

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case has its distinct features that must be grasped.<sup>1</sup> This last contention applies not only across countries but also within cases, over time. So it is essential to consider what has changed in Canada since the 1995 referendum. In examining the fallout of that episode, it becomes

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included within a seceding Quebec. Their view that Quebec should be partitioned and that their right of self-determination could be exercised has been well propagated and has attracted some support from the federal government.<sup>7</sup> Notably, Ottawa changed a long-established position and supported the "fundamental human right of self-determination" for "indigenous peoples" at a United Nations

*Indigenous Peoples' Right to Self-Determination*


political, constitutional, and territorial obligations of our nation."<sup>12</sup>  
The partitionist movement received some encouragement from the







In Ontario, a legislative committee has recommended that referen-



explanation of what the fallout would be, and nothing concerning

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A final result of these changes renders a quick, clean secession even less likely. This is the linkage of two separate sets of negotiations

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In any recession, the attitude of other countries is important, and not

secession because of its great implications for American interests. More provocatively, he argued that Canada might well fragment under the impact of this event, because there would be less incentive for inter-regional redistribution, a jarring geographic discontinuity between the parts of the Canada that were left, and deep suspicion in western

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*Manoeuvring towards  
the Next Referendum*

referendum on sovereignty but that his government would not amend the prevailing legislation that prohibited holding two referendums on similar questions during the life of a legislature.<sup>2</sup> Hence, another sovereignty referendum had to follow a provincial election, which

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provinces to constrain the federal government. For example, its ef-

work week and salaries as the only alternative to large-scale layoffs.<sup>33</sup>

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and also by the Reform Party because it did not provide for national

the West, where the proposal set off a firestorm of opposition because it treated provinces differently and took a cavalier attitude towards British Columbians' regional aspirations.<sup>57</sup> In short order, the federal government amended the bill to make British Columbia a

Other Plan A initiatives followed, notably in the area of "communications," reflecting the prime minister's belief that "there is a lack of knowledge by a lot of people in Quebec."<sup>66</sup> The government took out full-page newspaper advertisements to counter PQ claims that provincial spending cuts were caused by reduced federal transfers, and it distributed to every Quebec household a pamphlet about how Ottawa had met its referendum commitments.<sup>67</sup> Such efforts were to be coordinated by a new federal agency, the Canadian Information

Labour's modest programme 74 Part of this effort was to ...

federalists the referendum result was "a reprieve rather than a

Clearly, the early post-referendum initiatives and subsequent changes in federal-provincial program responsibilities had not sufficed to alter the views of many Quebecers.

Mr Dion continued a vigorous crusade in favour of distinct society recognition, making many speeches to groups across the country, especially in the West. In the West, Dion had a long record of

*Plan B*

The other major prong of the federal government's post- and pre-referendum strategy was Plan B. This comprised a series of initia-



since Ottawa aimed to manage the constitutional crisis with a combination of strategies, was it yet prepared to embrace Plan B to the extent of negotiating with the PQ about the process and terms of

by most sovereigntists, some moderate nationalists were forced to concede the logic of Ottawa's position.<sup>114</sup> And although Mr Dion's principle was embraced by partitionist groups in Quebec, many mod-


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to secession. Federal strategists believed that if a unilateral secession were held to be illegal, Quebecers might be less likely to vote Yes in

included a denial that the court had jurisdiction over the matter.<sup>145</sup> It was against this claim, and to have the relevance of both the constitution and the judiciary affirmed, that the federal government acted: "This is a position with which the Attorney General of Canada disagrees. Neither international law nor Canadian constitutional law confer on the National Assembly of Quebec the right to unilateral secession. Disagreement on this important point itself demonstrates that there are substantive *legal* issues in this case that are justiciable in the Superior Court."<sup>146</sup>

The PQ government was outraged. It rejected any denial of Quebecers' "sacred right" to determine their own future; it affirmed that "for us democracy rules over constitutional provisions" and it con-

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

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
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THE 1997 FEDERAL ELECTION

Plan A, Plan B, and the whole national unity issue dominated the  
1997 federal election. The national unity issue dominated the



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This forced the Bloc onto the offensive, and Mr Duceppe began to campaign against Plan B – “the negation of the existence of the Quebec people” – hoping to consolidate the soft-nationalist vote behind his party.<sup>196</sup> The divided sovereigntist camp coalesced once more, Mr Parizeau having persuaded its leaders that his writings had been mis-

The next referendum is scheduled for the 11th of October 2011.

rejected Reform's anti-Quebec message, and they gained 7 seats in Quebec. There, the Bloc vote slipped by over 11 per cent, to 38 per cent, and the party took 44 seats, down 10 from 1993. The Reform





maintained since the referendum of 1913.

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
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nied by a set of guidelines about the consultative process that would

... establish the mechanisms and timetable (the process was



the constituencies and every household received a pamphlet con-



had offered concrete demonstrations of the federation's flexibility.

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CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

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*What Would Happen after a Yes  
in a Future Referendum?*

fail, there would be a leadership void that would be debilitating to the sovereigntists. No one else within the movement currently has the experience, charisma, and determination necessary to carry it forward into a referendum with any chance of winning. Of course, a new leader with such qualities might emerge, but in the medium term the absence of Mr Bouchard would derail any referendum planning.

Second, the PQ could lose the next election. One must be held before the end of 1999, and as matters stand, another referendum





of other referendum cases. From his research on the subject, he found that

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develops a strong polarization between ROC and Quebec. In this case, the polls would show well before the vote that a Yes was inevitable. Each side would have time to prepare for the result. The financial

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circumstances, the Quebec government might proceed towards a UDI. Then several things could happen. The threat of a UDI, the damage it would cause, and the countermeasures it could require might well



a popular consultation or not, it remains seriously divided. In Quebec, meanwhile, the Yes result is widely accepted, so if there is popular consultation, either the Bloc receives massive support or the original

that the provincial security forces – the municipal police and the Sûreté du Québec – are united and reliable. It also implies that unrest among those Quebecers opposed to secession is relatively limited and that civil disobedience is geographically confined. Aboriginal peoples, for example, might either exclude Quebec authorities from their territories or move more aggressively to blockade autoroutes and airports;

regarded as valid by most Quebecers, who rally towards sovereignty. However, the result is contested aggressively by the Aboriginal peoples, minorities, and the partitionists. To produce meltdown, ROC must maintain its coherence. It might refuse to negotiate with C-

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have billions of dollars invested in Canada and will

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This might also occur after a UDI by Quebec. Intense disagreement on whether to resist it could greatly erode Ottawa's power, which also would be reduced if the UDI appeared to be succeeding. One or more provincial governments might then aim to bolt from a collapsing federation or to create new institutions to maintain a union with Quebec. The prospect of meltdown also could produce a movement



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... This scenario would require some minimal

The other scenarios are much less attractive. Some forms of renewed federalism might represent what the average Quebecer genuinely desires, but they would be achieved only after heavy economic losses



Table A1  
Selected Characteristics of Canada, Quebec, and ROC

	<i>Canada</i>	<i>Quebec</i>	<i>ROC</i>	<i>ROC as % of Canada</i>
1 Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	9,970,610	1,540,680	8,429,930	84.5
2 Population (000s) 1992	27,409	6,925	20,484	74.7
3 GDP (\$ billions) 1991	671,668	155,864	515,804	76.8

Table A2 Selected Characteristics of ROC

	<i>Nfd</i>		<i>PEI</i>		<i>NS</i>		<i>NB</i>	
	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC
1 Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	405,720	4.8	5,660	0.1	55,490	0.7	73,440	0.9

Ont		Man		Sask		Alta		BC		Yukon/NWT		ROC
Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	Actual	% ROC	ROC
1,068,580	12.7	649,950	7.7	652,330	7.7	661,190	7.8	947,800	11.2	3,909,770	46.4	8,429,930

Sources, tables A1 and A2: (1) Statistics Canada, *Canada Yearbook 1990*, table 1.1; (2) Statistics Canada, *Postcensal Annual Estimates of Population*, table 2; (3) Statistics Canada, *Provincial Economic Accounts: Annual Estimates, 1981-1991*, table 1 (Per capita figures





4 Bédard, "Constitutional Change," 40-5.

5 Young, "What Is Good about Provincial Governments?"

6 Covell, *Thinking about the Rest of Canada*, 13.

7 Kwavnick, "Québécois Nationalism," 54.

8 Resnick, *Toward a Canada-Quebec Union*, 52; Resnick, *Thinking Provincial*.

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differ across regions, small regions such as western Canada generally get the 'wrong' macro policy."

4 On the importance to sovereigntists of monetary policy as an

adjustment mechanism, see, for example, F. H. C. "The Adjustment of



- 9 *Parti québécois, La souveraineté: Pourquoi? Comment?* 36. ("In becoming sovereign, of course, Quebec will cut the political link with the federal regime, but in the interest of Quebec...")

Simeon and Janigan, *Toolkits*, 160-2: the former clerk of the privy council outlined a "prescriptive mythology" that would define factors supportive of a more centralized federation than many others envisage.

- 4 For an effort along these lines, see Gibbins, "Speculations on a Canada without Quebec." In Courchene's words, these are efforts to discern "the impact of the hole on the parts" ("Staatsnation vs Kulturnation," 2).
- 5 Lemco, *Political Stability*, 17.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 Compare Stéphane Dion, "Why is Secession Rare?" with Léon Dion,



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
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conform with the United Nations Charter as amplified by the  
Principle of "Cooperation in Friendly Relations" (1). See also Turn



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disengagement of a unit from a federation. A federation which has been in existence for any length of time builds up many internal links

121 Lamont, *Breakup*, 26.

122 *Ibid.*, 244. It is worth noting that the

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24 Laycock, "Reforming Canadian Democracy," 226.

25 Mr Manning's initial speech in the House of Commons failed to



43 André Blais has argued that any entry of Aboriginal issues into the

58 Lloyd Atkinson, "A Comment," 53.

59 Bank of Canada, *Bank of Canada Review, Winter 1993-1994*, tables F1, F7, and G6. This assumes gross new bond issues of \$50.04 billion, as


61 Well over 90% of Canadians consider the U.S. health care system to be



- 11 Boothe, Johnston, and Powys-Lybbe, "Dismantling Confederation," 30–6.
- 12 Ibid., tables 3, 5, 6.
- 13 Business "What Does Confederation Affect?" *McGraw-Hill*

33 This sentiment is not found only in the West. Pierre Martin has analysed polls that investigated attitudes towards post-secession economic association. The responses vary according to the precise

include the Constitution Acts, the Acts and orders listed in the  
Schedule to CA 1982 and the ...





extraordinary additions to the Senate it will be expected to consid-



opportunity to seal a new relationship based on truth and respect" – the more irritation he seems to create (*La Presse*, 26 October 1994). A  
... in the BOC says that "there is no role for a separatist like

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project: bread and butter after such a major political change"). See also *Globe and Mail*, 17 March 1995.

32 *La Presse*, 10 March 1995.

33 *Le Devoir*, 12 March 1995, on the Société Saint-Jean-Baptiste de



62 *Montreal Gazette*, 7 June 1995; *Globe and Mail*, 4 July 1995.

63 "Acceptez-vous que le Québec devienne souverain, après avoir offert formellement au Canada un nouveau partenariat économique et

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION - U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1985 F. D. 282-5

October, 1995

103 *Globe and Mail*, 29 July 1995.

104 *Globe and Mail*, 14 and 15 September 1995.





Léger & Léger that showed no sharp increase in Yes support (rather



44 *Le Devoir*, 28–9 October 1995 (“de ne plus être une minorité dans le pays de nos voisins anglophones mais une majorité dans notre propre pays. Affirmer, une fois pour toutes, notre langue et notre culture francophone d’Amérique”). Accessed at <http://www.ledevoir.com>, 11/10/97.



12. *Chlorophyll a* (1967)

the PQ government would have issued a UDI soon after a Yes vote.

It is not clear that under certain conditions this would have been

involve heavy costs indeed, but it is hard to see how anyone believing in them could reject Yes voters as uninformed on the grounds that they thought their Yes would be a mistake. It is

those foreseen by Monahan. The agency problem makes this inter-



judges the consequences of a vote for sovereignty, it is also true that a

- 5 This is sensitive to the question posed, however. Throughout 1995, about 70% agreed that Quebec had the right to separate (Lachapelle, "La souveraineté-partenariat" 60, fig. 1). In 1996, 68% agreed that

to ... 1995 ... 25% ...

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40 *Globe and Mail*, 4 December 1996. See Gibson, *Renewing the Federation: Options for British Columbia*, esp. 9-42.

41 *Globe and Mail*, 20 November 1996.

former premier's book was released, "Just the notion! *France? France! Come on!*" (*Globe and Mail* 22 May 1997)



- 11 *Globe and Mail*, 22 November 1996. Over 43% felt that Mr Bouchard would be the best premier, as opposed to 21.4% for Mr Johnson.
- 12 The text of his speech is in the *Globe and Mail*, 13 March 1996.

33 *Globe and Mail*, 27 and 28 November, 10 and 17 December 1996.

34 *Globe and Mail* 19 February 7 and 19 March 1997



54 Ibid., 16961, 16975, and 16980.

Mme Robillard shifted to Citizenship and Immigration. See Greenspon and Wilson-Smith, *Double Vision*, 349-70.

2) Part of Mr. Dine's statement, 114 Cl. (1974) 114-115

Nevertheless, the premiers pressed Ottawa to proceed without

[REDACTED]

Quádracis in the recognition of Quabodá...

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"Canadians Must Start Dealing with the Unthinkable," *Toronto Star*,  
18 February 1996.

102 Reform Party of Canada, *Reform Responses to the Twenty Questions*. See

*Cleveland Mail* 1 December 1995 and 19 January 1996. Among

willing to hold your coat as you prepare to fight, they will not be there, or representative of anybody else outside of Quebec, in the event of a decision by Quebecers to separate" (Kierans, *President's Digest* 1). See also Rashevkin. "Myths and Rebuttals." As the

130 *Globe and Mail*, 16 May and 1 October 1996.

131 *Globe and Mail*, 28 September 1996.

132 Mr Dion stated, "The National Assembly has a perfect right to ask any question it wants. But to accomplish secession requires a question on secession. If you pose a question that is confused and leads to other possibilities, you are not in a situation where you are able to negotiate secession" (*Globe and Mail*, 1 October 1996).

133 *Globe and Mail*, 21 December 1995. There were also suggestions that

143 *Montreal Gazette*, 28 October 1995.




Assembly and that it both reduced the assembly's powers, in part by

§ 10(1) of the *Canadian Charter of Rights and*

177 See the Angus Reid poll reported in the *London Free Press*, 26 April 1997.

178 Jeffrey Simpson, "Like an Unwelcome Guest, the Issue of Unity Just





the Reform Party leader put it, because any powers granted to

Q. I have read "The Reform Party" by [redacted] "at least, as a result of the

[The remainder of the page is heavily redacted with thick black horizontal bars.]

256 *Globe and Mail*, 13 December 1997.

257 Lysiane Gagnon, "Why Bouchard Was Wise to Refuse Ottawa," *Globe and Mail*, 20 December 1997.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

- 1 Note, however, that even this depends on the course of events. After the Meech Lake Accord failed to be ratified, the QLP was profoundly divided; and after the Bélanger-Campeau Commission reported, it was Robert Bourassa's Liberal government that decided to hold a referendum.
- 2 *Maclean's*, 16 June 1997, 20.
- 3 The most striking case is the Great Coalition of 1864 between George Brown's Reformers and the Conservatives under John A. Macdonald.

to retaliate, to be aggressive, to be negative. No. They will come with respect but confident, with the confidence of a prime minister, a head

responsible for the debt, currency, defense, tariff, and the customs

Accountant's name

Address of the firm



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
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