

Acknowledgements

To my loving parents
Leo Llorente Antonio

Abstract

Religious and cultural revivals in post-communist regions challenged Western concepts of secularism and modernity. To account for the prevalence of religion in the public sphere, social scientists have developed a number of theories, one of the most prominent and debated being Jürgen Habermas's theory of deliberative democracy. In order to integrate religious participation in the public sphere, both religious and non-religious citizens should work together to promote a cooperative civic discourse. However, Habermas's theory is criticized that his thinking is laden with Eurocentric-Western biases that favor liberal mentalities, neglect the discursive history of religious participation in civic discourse, and predominantly view secularity as an attribute of Western society. Despite these criticisms, social scientists have emphasized a key feature in postsecular theory² reflexivity. Postsecular reflexivity connotes an awareness that religious traditions and secularism are valid sources in order to enrich society. Similarly, Shmuel Eisenstadt's theory of multiple modernities argues that there is no single standard model of a modern society, and in order for society to develop its own variant of modernity based on its own history it must display self-reflexivity. Thus, this theory disputes the notion that non-Western societies replicate and accommodate Western hegemonic patterns of modernity. To explore the application of a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities in non-Western, non-Christian, and non-democratic contexts, the case of post-communist Tatarstan will be examined. Tatarstan is a multicultural society and is characterized by its Tatar Muslim and Russian Orthodox society.

Introduction

The sociologist

This essay consists of three chapters. The first chapter provides a review of the postsecular literature beginning with Habermas. It argues that the postsecular is not a singular theoretical framework that is limited in assessing predominantly Western, democratic, and Christian societies. Instead, this framework can provide new ways to assess the various manifestations of religious and secular worldviews globally. The chapter concludes that an additional theory, however, is required to expand the postsecular framework for these applications.

, Q W K H V H F R Q G F K D S W H M U l t i p l e M o d e r n i t i e s (T h e o r y o f M M T) D i s G W ¶ V considered in relation to postsecular theory. Eisenstadt argues against a single standard model of a modern society. As such, he proposes that each society develops its own version of modernity in the context of its own history. Thus, MMT disputes the implicit notion that non-Western societies simply replicate and accommodate Western hegemonic patterns of modernity.⁴ In the last half of chapter two I elaborate on Kristina 6 W R H F N O ¶ V S K U D V H ³ S R V W V H F X O D U moder Q L W L H V ´ S D U W L F X O D U O \ L Q F R Q M X Q F W L R Q Z L W K : L O O I argument that MMT provides an avenue to analyze the role of ethnic and religious identities when constructing national identity. I will conclude that a feasible route to assess the concept of postsecular perspective of multiple modernities is to examine the tensions that arise at public boundaries when religion-as-culture is used to support political endeavors. In particular, this study considers the development of an ethno-religious national identity through public policies in order to manage collective identity as one of the types of political endeavors that religion-as-culture can be used to bolster.

In the third chapter, I explore the interaction of postsecular theory and Multiple Modernities Theory through an examination of the Tatars. The Tatars are a Turkic people located in the Volga

⁴ 6 K P X H O (L V H Q V W D G W ³ D a x o m , L 2 9 Q 1 1 0) 0 2 R 4 G H U Q L W L H V ´

region which is east of Moscow. The Tatars converted to Islam during the 10th century³ by the missionary work of Ahmad ibn Fadl al-Razi. Little is known of Tatar religious life before their conversion; what is known is that the Tatars were colonized by the Mongols, the Golden Horde, who occupied the region from the twelfth to fourteenth

gender equality, supporting multiculturalism, and promoting educational reforms that allow forms of knowledge beyond the religious to inform Tatar-Islamic identity. It also recognizes that both religious and secular discourses contribute to ethno-religious identity and civic discourse. Jadidism in contemporary Tatarstan therefore lends itself to being analyzed through a combination of MMT and postsecular theory because of the way it acknowledges the role of religion in the public sphere. Specifically, this chapter explores the influence of the Jadid movement on the religious identity through educational reforms and language policy. The Tatar case study provides an avenue to investigate the feasibility of a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities in a non-Western context

Ultimately, this study highlights the need for further research on religion and modernity in non-Western contexts. In particular, the investigation of post-communist nations like Tatarstan may lead to a better understanding of the transformative role of religious and secular worldviews under the conditions of late modernity.

Chapter 1: Postsecular Theory

The aim of this chapter is twofold: to explore the genesis of postsecular theory and to review how this framework has been altered and applied by other scholars in order to explain local specificities beyond Western, democratic, and Christian contexts. This exploration of the postsecular framework will lay the foundation for the discussion of the Republic of Tatarstan in chapter three.

Postsecular theory acknowledges the role of religion in the public sphere and its contribution to civic discourse. Habermas views the postsecular as a cognitive recognition of

the public sphere and its impact on secular worldviews.¹⁰ In postsecular theory, secular and religious worldviews are seen as contributors to society. However,

Habermas does not elaborate concerning the extent to which or in what ways secular and religious worldviews contribute to society. Nonetheless, secular and religious worldviews, contest

For Habermas, religion within a postsecular society is

individual life projects, and the deformation of misarranged existential relationships¹¹ According

premodern and post-

EHWZHHQ UHOLJLRQ DQG UHDVRQV RU UDWLRQDOLW\` ZKLF

in understanding revelation and how « diverse religious traditions are open to reasoned self-

FULW¹³ Furthermore, Dillon states that this polarization LPSOLHV WKDW +DEHUPDV

industrialization and bureaucratization.¹⁶ The observation of a decline in the relevance of religion due to the differentiation of social institutions, the ascendancy of scientific rationality, and a decrease church attendance formed the core of these twentieth century theories of secularization. The American sociologist José Casanova has distilled three major definitions of secularization that have developed in these debates over the last number of years.

7KH ILUVW LV ³IXQFWLRQDO GLIIHUHQWLDO WSLRQ' ZKLFK
RI UHOLJLRXV SROLWLFDO ¹⁷ resulting in institutional spheres that are
autonomous from one another. For example, the state, the economy, and religious organizations
are considered to be institutionally autonomous, and theoretically cannot exert complete control
RYHU WKH RWKHU :KLOH WKLV XQGHUVWDQGGLQJ RI VHFXXO
social sciences, particularly within European sociology ' &DVDQRYD TXHVWLRQV

whether it is appropriate to subsume the multiple and diverse historical patterns of
differentiation and fusion of the v ET 3uh792 re 7QTm 0 8(ti)-3(oric18)4(l)-26(nd)-59v 19(g rop)i chu

Casanova, this process is understood to be, not only ³SDUW RI WKH ³PRGHUQ KLVWRU
D ³QRUPDWLYH FRQGLWLRQ´ DQG ³SUHFRQGLWLRQ²European IRU PRG
social scientists ³WHQG WR VZLWFK EDFN DQG IRUWK EHWZHHQ WKH
and the more recent meaning that points to the progressive, and, since the 1960s, drastic and
assumedly irreversible decline of religious beliefs and practices among the European population. ´
These European scholars

of secularization Peter Berger, who stated that ³ WKH ZRUOG WRGD \ « LV DV IXULRXV
ZDV DQG LQ V RPH SODFH At WKUHEVRG W³RD O LWHUDW V G H E \ K
VFLHQWL VWV ORRVHOW K D E U Q HLG / μ W H F K O M I U D J D W I P R I Q W F D N H Q C

the secularization paradigm is a response to the prevalence of religion in the public sphere and the pluralization of religion occurring in multicultural societies. As a result of these developments, he

issues such as abortion, assisted suicide and reproductive rights.²⁸ Habermas contends that the rise of pluralistic societies has brought religious and secular worldviews into competition for influence in the public sphere.²⁹

Third, with the rise of immigration and global mobility, societies face the challenge of PDLQWDLQLQJ D³ WR OTHUD QW ERHJH VWHQFH. With the growth in cultural and international social landscape.³⁰ Habermas postulates that, with the growth in social diversity through migration, societies have the potential of EHRPLQJ PRUH DZDUH RI WKH³ SXEOLF LC religion.³¹ Habermas does not specify how society is becoming aware of the public relevance of religion, but rather observes that with the pluralization of society through immigration there are more cultural and religious interactions occurring.

7KH 0HFKDQLFV RI +DEHUPDV¶ 3RVVHFXODU 7KHRU\

In the past decade, +DEHUPDV¶ postsecular theory has gained notoriety in academia. +DEHUPDV¶ theory is exemplified in *Between Naturalism and Religion*, which was built on his earlier works (e.g., *The Theory of Communicative Action* [1985]; *Post-metaphysical Thinking* [1992]).

SKLORVRSKLFDO³⁴)XDWGHPURDDH ' LQ RUGHU WR GHYHORS D
FLWLJHQV RI D OLEHUDO GHPRFUDF\ PXVW UHDFKis DQ DJUHH
WKHLU LUUHFRQFLODEOHT³⁵FRPSOHPHQWYonandtheReproces
involved are what Habermas rephrases DV WKH ³FRPSOHPHQWDU\ OHDUQLQJ S
7KH UDWLRQDOH EHKLQG +DEHUPDV³⁶in his argument that

inspired by Jadidism in an attempt to revive and reclaim the Tatars

ZRUOGYLHZV LV WKDW³ WKLWV SHFLSLFHE HDGICR¹ of
secular worldviews

XQLYHUV¹ DSHUFHLYHG DV³ DFKLHYLQJ DE/RQXWH PRUDO D
the social status of

dominant norm.⁴⁵ In that view, Braidotti explains that secular discourses have implicitly
presented religious and secular worldviews as mutually exclusive of one another, and

³ FRQVHTXHQWO\ OHDYH ,VODP LQQW\KHP RQGJWKCDLV SRV LWHLOR

³ VHFXODULVW⁶ LGWVHLOFAW/RQV
Grewse Habermas appears to maintain an Enlightenment perception

<DNK\ D \$ E C X O O O
 The contemporary adaptation of Jadidism is a 'philosophical system' that
 that SURYLASHV for spiritual and moral life; providing the foundation of Tatar culture; and
 protecting the unity of the Tatar nation, 'allowing Islam' to adapt to current scientific,
 SKLORVRSKLFDO DQGH SRO, in Wall Fa OM Wikl QNL D
 However, not all Tatar Muslims accept the contemporary
 adaptation of Islam offered by Jadidism. For instance, it has been rejected by some Muslim clerics
 in Tatarstan. As Shireen Hunter explains, Jadidism is predominantly supported by Tatar political
 HOLWHV ZKLOH WKH PDMRULW\ RI OXVOLP 7DWDUV 3YLHZ -

not only of the modernist dream of the total eclipse of the sacred or of the *privatization* of religion,

EXW DOVR WKH HQG RI FRQGLWLRQV RI ROSA AND STOCKHOLM IN A POSTSECULAR

society as multi-religious, where traditional faiths exist alongside ³GLDVSRULF UHOL

FRPPXQLWYHY that the coexistence of multiple worldviews enriches the public sphere

E\ LQFOXGLQJ ³LQGLYLGXDEHDOQBI V R DCCG RSMDFWUHOV L JLR XV

provide D ³VRXUFH ,RI³DHWRBQJRI V R DCCG D F R H M Q E /³WKH VHOI

UHIHUHQWLRQWRDOWEPTION of secularization.⁶² Religion in a postsecular society can

WDNH RQQWGRUHPV LPPDQHQW DQG FLYLF DV ZHOO DV W

tradition. In his view, postsecular theory can explain the Chinese U H J L R S H Q V aspects of religious tradition to facilitate governance. In 2001, the Chinese government began using 6 K D U L ¶ D law in Ningzia Hui ² a region with a population of 6.3 million which is 35 percent Chinese Muslims.⁶⁶ Erie argues that the Chinese regime exerts control over the multi-confessional population of this region by using the religious traditions present in the area.⁶⁷ Aspects of 6 K D U L ¶ D ODZ DUH SURWHFWHG XQGHU & KLQHVH ODSHVXFK DQFOGLG ³ DEOXWLRQV SUD ⁶⁸ However, other aspects of the religious law, such as family, property, divorce and marriage, are invalidated by the secular Chinese state.⁶⁹ Religious symbols and practices are thereby deprived of their sacred meanings. However, in China, they are transformed into tools of governance, not simply markers of tradition. Thus, according to Erie, the ERXQGDULHV EHWZH HQ VHF XODU DQG UHOLJLRXV ZRUOGYL depend[ing] on UHOLJLRXV DXWK RULWURW. ⁷⁰ While less aggressive than Chinese policy, the Tatar government is reclaiming Tatar ethno-

al., and Gregor McLennan ² who argue that citizens are not exclusively either religious or secular. Instead, these scholars contend that postsecular citizens fall along a continuum from conformity with to complete rejection of secular worldviews.

The inseparability of religion and politics in Islam raises a second challenge: the struggle to interpret ² in the context of postsecularity ² the assumed stubbornness of Islam to secular ⁸⁰ Pasha suggests ³ D Q D O W H U Q D W I L E . H O W E V E R , A C C O R D I N G TO PASHA, this idiom

recognize ³D FRQGLWLRQ RI SHUPDQHQQW WHQVLRQ´ SUHVHQQW L

secular outlooks within society.⁸⁶ Societal awareness of the presence of multiple discourses and influences on society opens up discursive spaces. These spaces could allow a society to reflectively interpret its religious, cultural and secular histories.

Chapter 2: Multiple Modernities Theory

The goal of chapter two is to determine whether there is a feasible synthesis of Multiple Modernities Theory and postsecular theory, in other words, a postsecular perspective of multiple modernities, that can explain cases outside the purview of Habermassian discourses. The specific case under consideration (in chapter three) will be Tatarstan and the nation-building project that uses Jadidism to reclaim Tatar ethno-religious identity.

Multiple Modernities Theory (MMT) rejects a normative-singular version of modernity.⁸⁷ Postsecular theory, the genesis of MMT is rooted in social theories on secularization. According Colin Jager, secularization theories viewed Western society as the neutral model in which complexity and reflexivity replace simplicity and tradition.⁸⁸ However, in the view of Eisenstadt,⁸⁹ that development is not the sole authentic model for modern society despite being the dominant historical reference point.⁸⁹

Unlike previous social theories having to do with secularization and modernization, MMT considers the society that

MMT allege a Western bias and question whether MMT is distinct from previous theories on secularization and modernization.

Are There Multiple Modernities?

Volker H. Schmidt argues that MMT cannot simply theorize that non-Western societies develop distinct variants of modernity by merely incorporating different cultural and religious traditions.⁹² Similarly, Alexander Agadjanian contests the feasibility of MMT and argues that

rejection of the relevance of Western hegemonic patterns in concepts of modernity do not diminish Western-⁹³ growth for with different

modernities but rather a variety of ways to accommodate western modernity and to be

According to Agadjanian,

the contestation of Western forms of modernization demonstrates a selection process where

Western conceptions of modernization legitimize non-

For Agadjanian, when societies select aspects of Western concepts of modernity, these societies

His

Western concept RI PXOWLFXOWXUDOLVP WR VXS SRUW 7DW DU VWD
 ethnic Russians. By doing so, the Tatar government reduced its explicit emphasis on Tatar ethno-religious identity and promoted a bilingual language policy.

From a postsecular perspective, the internal and external tensions produced by various responses and strategies among those with political clout demonstrates societal awareness that each opinion in society² whether from political leaders or minority groups² affects the reinterpretation of Western concepts of modernity such as bilingualism or multiculturalism; such awareness enables a given society to tailor Western concepts of modernity by considering local specificities such as its religious and ethnic makeup.

Multiple Modernities and Postsecular Theory

At this point, the Multiple Modernities Theory will be linked with postsecular theory. This provides the theoretical foundation for the case study in chapter three. To reiterate, a key issue this study investigates is the utilization of Jadidism by the government of Tatarstan. One of the defining features of Jadidism is its modern-reformist approach to ethnic-religious identity as a part of a nation-building project.

Similar to Habermas and Eisenstadt, Stoeckl considers religion as playing an important role in reinterpreting concepts of modernity.¹⁰⁴ For Stoeckl, in order to assess the role of religion in a given society is to synthesize postsecular theory and MMT. Though Stoeckl does not elaborate further on the phrase³ SRVWVHFXODU SHUVSHFWLYH RI PXOWLSOH I
 SRVWVHFXODU 007 HQDEOHV RQH WR DVVHV V³DFWRUV DQ

account for this displacement of ethnicity, in the modern state, HWKQLFLW\ LV YLHZHG D
 compone QW RI PRGHUQ QDWLRQDO¹⁰ L¹⁰ SHUHQHWWDQDQGLDGHIDROLDIIO
 EHWZHHQ WZR IRUPV RI QDWLRQDOZEMWPHUWKW\SHRDLQGLFDIO
 HDVWHU¹⁰ However, Spohn argues that neither considers the multiple influences on national

identity. In order to rectify this problem, 6SRKQ VXJJHVWV WKDW³ QDWLRQDO L
 FDQ EH FRQVWUXFWHG WKURXJK YDULRXV³ FERFERLPSRVLHQW

Second, Spohn views MMT as addressing criticisms similar to those that questioned the
 adequacy of the secularization thesis. He QRWHV WKDW LQ³ QHFWJ DWXGL
 relationship between religion, nation- EXLOGLQJ >DQG @ QDWLRQDOHQV P GRX
 WKH³ P³ Assumption that nation-state formation and modern nationalism dissolve religion

DQG UHOLJLRXV LGHQWLWLHV E¹³ VLPXODW IRP+D RH QDWLRQ
 the debates on secularization and the continuous reassertion of religion in the public sphere, Spohn
 argues that MMT can address the transformative role of³ UHOLJLRQ DQG UHQJLRXV
 nation- EXLOGLQJ DQG FROOHFWLDFRQFHFWLPçwç / s50 J p€PQ

Chapter 3: Reclaiming Tatar Ethno-Religious Identity

A postsecular perspective of multiple modernities articulates tensions that arise as a result of the coexistence of religious and secular worldviews in contemporary non-Western societies. One of the key characteristics a postsecular framework brings to MMT is an awareness of the transformative role of religion in public civic narratives. Through these civic narratives, religion impacts both national identity and public policy. Their synthesis therefore yields a promising theoretical tool for analyzing non-Western, non-democratic, and non-Christian contexts. This chapter tests that utility by applying it to the case of Tatarstan, where the Tatar government has had to balance its emphasis in public discourse and policy between religious, ethnic, and linguistic identities using an imported concept of multiculturalism. This balancing act has happened in the context of the Islamic modern reform movement of Jadidism and its survival through the Soviet period of state-enforced secularism. First, I provide a short history of Jadidism followed by a survey of the impact of Soviet antireligious policies on Tatar Islam. Second, I analyze the use of Jadidism by the Tatar government to promote educational reforms and language policy.

- D G L G L V P 7 D W D U M W D R F M Q D R L F

During the nineteenth century, D Q H Z P R Y H P H Q W H P H U J H G I U R P W K H + known as Jadidism. This was an Islamic modern reform movement supported by Tatar intellectuals and religious elites.¹²¹ The Jadid movement saw modernization as a way to improve Tatar religious life and education. These reforms included R S H Q L Q J W K H L Q W H U S i j u h a m D W L R Q R order to introduce Western scientific knowledge into Tatar education, and supporting political autonomy from Imperial Russia.¹²²

¹²¹ Gordon M. Hahn, *Russia Islamic Threat* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 174.

¹²² Adeeb Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 4 #0.

Like today, during the nineteenth century, Tatarstan was home to a multitude of ethnic and religious communities. However, there was still resistance to Jadid reforms, the main source of which came from the conservative ¹²³ *Waqids* and the enclaves of the Sufi brotherhood.¹²³ According to Adeb Khalid, the Jadid reformers struggled over the interpretation of Islam with older and more conservative elites.¹²⁴ Khalid argues that these conservatives wished to prevent the use of religious and cultural symbols by Jadid reformers to propagate a systematic and self-¹²⁵ *Waqids* and promote such as scientific knowledge, distinct from Islam.¹²⁵ From a conservative perspective, Jadidism departed from traditional understandings of Islam as inseparable from all aspects of daily life. Despite this resistance, reforms did occur; for example, changes were made to the educational system in Kazan, the current capital of Tatarstan. Religious schools in Kazan were encouraged to promote a Jadidist ¹²⁶ *Waqids* instead of viewing the sacred texts as a source of immutable knowledge.¹²⁶ *Waqids* would encourage the growth of secular forms of knowledge. In the eyes of Gordon Hahn, who specializes in Russian and Eurasian political history, the nineteenth century Jadid educational reforms distinguished Jadid ¹²⁷ *Waqids* in the view of Hahn, the Jadid educational reforms in nineteenth century Kazan were able to directly ¹²⁷ *Waqids*

The Jadid movement also cultivated a secular form of Islamic nationalism in order to

¹²³ Alexandre Bennigsen, *Muslims of the Soviet Empire* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 5.

¹²⁴ Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 5.

¹²⁵ Khalid, *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform*, 113.

¹²⁶ Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat*, 176.

¹²⁷ Hahn, *Russia's Islamic Threat*, 177.

distance Tatars from their identity as imperial subjects of Russia. ,QIOXHQFHG E\ ³URPI
GLVFRXUVHV RI QDWLRQRG´

Q D W L R Q D O A L V M W With this, the government of Tatarstan created *The All-Tatar Public Center* (ATPC), whose goal was to synthesize Islam with contemporary public policy. Its guiding principle was that 3

language policy illustrates postsecular reflexivity, not only because there is an emphasis on Tatarstan ~~¶ V , V O D P~~, but also because there is a consideration of its impact on the present

D Q G I X W X U H R I 7 D W D U V W D Q ¶ V P X O W L F X O W X U D O V R F L H W \

The Tatar government explicitly sought to depict Tatar Islam as the standard form of Islam

w

values 'it would be n HFHVVDU\ WR RIIHilr PretatFRQWHP SRUDDm of
 WKH VSLULW R C W K H 4 X U P D W X O O L Q P R Y ¶ V Y L H Z R Q - D G L G L V P L J Q L
 Tatar intellectuals and religious elites. Of central importance was the balance between establishing
 a society guided by WKH 4 X U P D W X O O L Q P R Y ¶ V Y L H Z R Q - D G L G L V P L J Q L including the identification
 accomplishments of the West. ¹⁵⁵ In debating this issue, Valiulla Yakupov, a former member of
 Tatarstan ¶ V U H O L J L R X V E R D U G S X E O L F O \ Y R L F H G R Y S S R V L W L R Q
 argued that this 'Eurocentric 'interpretation of Islam was ³ D U W L H F E D D O O L to please
 the West and certain circles, 'including the central Russian government. ¹⁵⁶ Yakupov suggested
 WKD W W R ³ R - Y H U C F R P H Y P X U P D W X O O L Q contemporary developments in Jadidism, Tatar
 society should instead invest its efforts in reviving + D Q D I - ¹⁵⁷ Yakupov argued that + D Q D I -
 Islam could equally sustain ³ 7 D W D U H W K Q L a n d S O R F X O O D W L D G H W S I R Q
 secular concepts. ¹⁵⁸ Conversely, . K D N L P R Y D U J X H G W K D W 7 D W D U 0 X V O L P V
 possibility of reinterpreting Islam simply E H F D X O O H ³ K D Y H ³ : H V W H U Q R U L J
 and ³ W K H (D V W Z L O O Q R W W D N H ¹⁵⁹ O a t h e r, K u b a n o v s u g g e s t e d t h a t W V S X U H
 D O W H U Q D W L Y H Z R X O G - E L H W R S U H M H F W H W H U Q as
ijtihad (the act of personal interpretation), which he argues is an , V O D P L F I R U P R I ³ O L
 thinking ¹⁶⁰ . K X U P D W X O O L Q V W D W H V W K D W . K D N L P R Y ¶ V Y L H Z R Q
 R I W K H, e x a m p l i f i e d b y h i s s t a t e m e n t t h a t : ³ W K H I D L W K I X O S t o A l l a h b e c a u s e E H V O D
 they have chosen of their own free Z L O O W R S U D a n d W i l l f i s h t h e e m o u r n e n t of the

¹⁵⁴ \$ J D W . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q R i s . Q a n d P I (I n W S z i e, C o l i e y a n d L W K Q D W L
Radicalism, ed. Roland Dannreuther et al. (New York: Routledge, 2010), 114.
¹⁵⁵ . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q '
¹⁵⁶ . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q '
¹⁵⁷ . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q '
¹⁵⁸ . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q '
¹⁵⁹ . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q '
¹⁶⁰ . K X U P D W X O O L Q ³ 7 D W D U V W D Q '

the public sphere.¹⁷⁹ To reverse this

Tatar government implemented a language policy that declared the official languages of Tatarstan

to be Russian and Tatar. This language policy was followed by the 1997 educational law that

part of the educational reforms, new science academies were established alongside Islamic

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¹⁷⁹ *RUHQEXUJ ³7DWDU /DQJXDJH 3ROLFLHV ' ¹⁸⁰ Teresa Wiggleworth- %DNHU ³/DQJXDJH 6%KRC@LDQG Q DWDWDDingW DQ ' LQ

con F H U Q ' W K D W W K H S U L R U L W L] D W L R Q R I W i g h t l e a d D W D U O D
3 G L V F U L P L Q D W L R Q E D V H G 185 R A O D Q U X D J H N Q R Z O H G J H '
A war of these dimensions, the

government curtailed its asymmetric emphasis on the Tatar language to sustain a co-operative relationship with ethnic Russians living in Tatarstan. In turn, the Tatar language policy was promoted as a bilingual language policy to showcase the equal importance of Russian and Tatar.¹⁸⁸

As Gorenburg states, the promotion of bilingualism saw a concomitant rise in Russians endorsing both languages. For example, L Q D V X U Y H \ 3 V K R Z H G W K D W Russians and 92 percent of rural Russians wanted their children to learn Tatar.¹⁸⁹ By 2001, V X U Y H \ V L Q G L F D W H G W K D W [s u p p o r t e d] t h e i d e a t h a t f a t h e r s s h o u l d t e a c h t h e i r c h i l d r e n R u s s i a n s 5 X V V V S H D N E R W K 5 X V V 190 H O W E V E R D E S P I T E T H E R E L A T I V E s u c c e s s o f t h e T a t a r l a n g u a g e p o l i c y a n d e d u c a t i o n a l r e f o r m s , a c c o r d i n g t o M a t t h e w D e r r i c k , t h e a s c e n d e n c y o f V l a d i m i r P u t i n i n 2 0 0 1 h a d a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t R Q W K H J R Y H U Q P H Q W R 7 D W D U V W D Q ¶ V religious identity.

In 2002, under the Putin government, 7 D W D U V W D Q O R V W L W V 3 V W D W X V D V became 3 D μ V X E M H F W ¶ R I W K H 5 R O O I R Z Q Q J H G B W D W V R D Q ¶ V F K D amendment was implemented to curtail the use of titular languages² ethnic languages not recognized by the central Russian government as official languages² across Russia.¹⁹² The

187 * R U H Q E X U J 3 7 D W D U / D Q J X D J H 3 R O L F L H V '
188 1 L J D P R Y D 3 (W K Q L F 7 D W D U V '
189 * R U H Q E X U J 3 7 D W D U / D Q J X D J H 3 R O L F L H V '
190 * R U H Q E X U J 3 7 D W D U / D Q J X D J H 3 R O L F L H V '
191 Teresa Wiggleworth-Baker, 3 / D Q J X D J H 3 R O B R Y D I G 3 R H O W L W a t i o n a l i t i e s Q 7 D W D U V W D U P a p e r s 4 4 , n o . 1 (2 0 1 6) : 2 2 .
192 , Q W K H 7 D W D U V W D Q J R Y H U Q P H Q W V Z L W F K H G W R / D W L Q I U R P 8 l i n g u i s t i c d i s t i n c t i v e n e s s . T h e T a t a r p e o p l e s h a r e c u l t u r a l t i e s w i t h o t h e r L a t i n - s c r i p t - u s i n g T u r k i c s t a t e s ; a n d i t P D G H W U D Q V O D W L R Q H D V L H U F R P S D U H G W R & \ U L O O L F 6 H H . \ O H / 0 D U A n a l y s i s o f L a n g u a g e P o l i c y i n T a t a r s t a n a n d K a z a k h s t a n , 1 9 9 1 ± ' M e t r o p o l i t a n i t y a n d P o l i t i c s i n C e n t r a l A s i a a n d t h e C a u c a s u s , e d . M o h a m m e d A y o o b a n d M u r a d I s m a y i l o v (N e w Y o r k : R o u t l e d g e , 2 0 1 5) , 4 9 .

continuous tension among reformists, traditional religious actors, D Q G ³ Q H Z P R G H U Q S U R
that play out publicly.²⁰¹ The adaptive and reflexive approach illustrated by

&RQFOXVLRQ

*LYHCKHHYDHOEHHORLJLRQLQWKHSXEOLFVSKHUHWKHUHL
 VRFLDOVFLHQRWRBFWHWWWHPRQRIOWWHKURDOO\QRU UHOLJLRX
 +DEHUSPWWVMKXEDUUFJRJQLJHV DQGLQWKO DDKHFRQDAHF
 VHFODU VRFDHWHLIDHISWEIXFWGLVFRXSURFHGXUDWUIGEHRU
 UHOWRSDHURIWKH SXEOLF VSKHUHG HOLPLW KDWHQMJLRX
 SURSRVHV WKDW ZLWKLQHQ\$REWVKFXDQJHVRJLRHVA GHQD J
 SURFHGXUDO GHOHUDWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR LQFRUSRUDV
 +DEHQPDMWVLFKLBKH OH 'LOORQHQ*QHQ RUDVDRS 5BMDWILQD
 6WRHFDYH LQGDDEWSPDWWVHFODU WKHRU\ SRUWUD\ V WKH
 ZLWKLQ D SRVWVHFODU VRFLHW\ DV SUBGRFXQDIQWHOKLWHF
 UHOLJLRXV SDUWLFLSDWLRQRHQHFWKGSRFRWELJHQV ZLWKL
 VRFLHW\ FDQ KDUERU ERWK UHQDELRQDQGLGSRMFXODUOPH
 VRFLDWWHVV SURFHVV SURRHHGHQHEHEWLDVH GLVFXUVLYH VS
 DZDUHQHV VDIQGWVHIFDILLRGLVFRFXGLWHLVRQURI LQ

7KH V\QWKRHWVWRFRMROGJ 00RU DV , KDYH FDDVWLRGLW
 DSRVWVSHFXODUFWLYFRRIHDXFRVLGHUUV WKH PXOWLSOLFLW\
 FXOWRUDDPSKXV DOORZLVWKRQHWRRI UHOLJLRXV DQG VHFXY
 LQ FXOWXUDO DQGSRKODWLWDE SURJRIDVGLGLVP E\ WKH 7D
 V\QWKHVLJH ,VODP ZLWK SXEOLF SROLWLFLEJXDVKZHQJOEDWZKH
 RI UHOLJLRXV DQG VHFXYODU GLVFRXUVHV SUHVHQW LQ VR
 DEWUDEFWLQJ VRFLDO DFWRUV DQG KXPDQ DJHQF\ EXW U
 VRFLDO DFWRUV EQWKHDOGHSSXEOLFFSRHOLF\

,Q WKDW UHJDUG FDVHV VWXGLHV VXFK DV WKLV RQH
 DVSHFWV RI UHOLJLRXV WUDGLWLRQV VXFK DV WKH HGXF
 SROLWLFDO DQG FXOWXUDVLIHWRXFLDQVDFWRUVFRUG JRYHU
 WR XVH UHOLJLRXV WUDGLWLRQV QRW RQO\ DV D PHDQV
 PDQDJLQJ FROOHFWLYH LGHQWLW\ 7KH XVH RI -DGLGLVP
 SURPRWH,VODP DV D WROHUDQW IRUP RI ,VODP DQG WR VX
 SROLFLHV WKDW KDYH EXWWUHVVE FOWO

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Walters, 3 K L O L S U ³ \$ H 6 R I 6 R Y L H W 5 H R O I g i o L R X i y i 3 R e C o l e U n i o n , Q
edited by Sabrina Petra Ramet, 3 ±