




# Fisheries Subsidies Negotiations: Where we are and what we've learned

Alice Tipping  
18 November 2021





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
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Note: Capacity-enhancing subsidies tend to promote overinvestment in a fisheries resource once fishing exceeds the ecological carrying capacity of the resource, while ambiguous subsidies can promote overinvestment in fisheries resources; see Schaltegger et al. (2013).

Source: Schaltegger et al. (2013, p. 7)


WTO Member	Production (MT): Average	World share of m	Subsidies	Members >3% global catch
	2017-2019	2017-2019		
	(FAO data)			
China	12676279	13.44%	\$ 3,121,097,344	
Indonesia	6658473	8.11%	\$ 312,244,601	
Peru	5358507	6.58%	\$ 3,102,323,525	
United States	4847391	5.90%	\$ 1,010,903,361	DCs only = 39% Global catch
Russian Federation	4717901	5.75%	\$ 1,135,405,292	
India	3743303	4.56%	\$ 1,035,072,476	75% Global subsidies
Vietnam	3209310	3.91%	\$ 770,000,001	DCs only: 37% Global
Japan	2,330,000	3.00%	\$ 1,300,000,000	
Norway	2398289	2.92%	\$ 398,706,054	
Chile	2,000,000	2.40%	\$ 2,357,726	
Philippines	1839302	2.24%	\$ 136,575,558	
Other developing members	1,700,000	2.10%	\$ 500,000,000	25% Global catch
Mexico	1,492,180	1.77%	\$ 190,000,000	19% Global
Morocco	1,300,000	1.60%	\$ 270,000,000	
Korea, Rep.	1,300,000	1.60%	\$ 500,000,000	
LDC	1,159,850	1.41%	\$ 115,400,000	
Iceland	1,100,000	1.30%	\$ 95,453,813	
Mauritania	810,000	0.99%	\$ 7,815,374	
Argentina	800,000	1.00%	\$ 101,519,800,000	
Canada	770,000	0.94%	\$ 352,400,1478	
Chinese Taipei	700,000	0.82%	\$ 400,000,000	
LDC	600,000	0.70%	\$ 60,000,000	
0.70% Ecuador	609,263	0.74%	\$ 10,109,990	
South Africa	508,700	0.6%	\$ 26,012,065	Developing Members with <0.5% Global catch 11% Global
Uganda	400,000	0.5%	\$ 40,000,000	0%
Brazil	480,000	0.6%	\$ 156,344,403	
Nepal	400,000	0.5%	\$ 40,000,000	
LDC	300,000	0.4%	\$ 30,000,000	

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